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FLORILEGIUM PHILONIS.¹

My object this evening is to say something about Philo to those who know a little about him already. I am not going to tell you the ordinary things about his life and environment which you will find in every text book, nor shall I attempt the slightest account of his philosophical system as a whole. If anybody has casually read Principal Drummond's book on Philo, he will follow my lecture the better, but he will not necessarily find it superfluous or wearisome unless he has read that admirable work four or five times through. Let me say at once about Dr. Drummond's book how much I owe to it. I have only one fault to find, and that is on the score of brevity. It is much too short. All we have is well worth having, but we want a good deal more which we have not got. I hope a considerably enlarged edition may appear before long.

Do not then expect even an outline of Philo's system. But, on the other hand, I will not confine myself to vague generalities. Philo is so strange and curious a writer that he lends himself to this method of treatment very readily. You can moralise about that fusion of Greek and Hebrew ideas of which, on a large and philosophic scale, he is the greatest and most important illustration; you can make sage deductions upon his failure to influence the development of Judaism, or wise reflections upon his influence on Christian theology; you can laugh at his extraordinary methods of exegesis, and contrast his allegorical explanations and Scriptural difficulties with other and perhaps better solutions in modern times; you can show how he attempted a union of irreconcilable opposites, and in accordance with your own opinions you can point the moral and adorn your tale.

**Object and
Method of the
Essay.**

My object is far simpler. It is merely to pick out and arrange from the great mass of the Philonic writings certain salient thoughts and sentences which seem worthy of notice and recollection. If I had dared, I would have called my lecture, "Tit-Bits from Philo." In another generation I should have said, "Elegant Extracts." Though letting Philo speak mainly for himself, I shall string my extracts together upon a thread of my own; but the thread will not be systematic or philosophical.

Before I begin, however, I should like, after all, to have just two or three minutes for moralising and general remarks.

I dare say I shall often quote admiringly some statements of Philo

¹ A Lecture delivered before the Jews' College Literary Society on February 10th, 1895.

which are not Philo's at all. I do not mean that he did not write them, but that he borrowed them, perhaps consciously, from some other philosopher. It is not merely that his doctrine of the Logos is based upon Heracleitean and Stoic teaching. In almost every part of his religious and ethical writings he is under obligations to the Greeks. Philo, moreover, had read and used the works of many philosophers which have since been lost, and scholars are beginning to investigate his writings as a possible source for the knowledge of these half-forgotten treatises. When Cohn and Wendland have given us a critical edition of Philo's text, their successors in the same field may use that text for an annotated edition in which the extent of Philo's philosophic indebtedness will be fully revealed.

It was to the purpose to say that here because most of what we admire in Philo to-day is fundamentally Greek rather than fundamentally Hebrew. It is Greek philosophy, coloured, modified, transfigured by Hebraism.

Different readers will naturally be arrested by different passages, and one man's Florilegium Philonis would differ from another's. On the whole, it is just to say that Philo improves on nearer acquaintance. Large tracts will always remain dull, arid and of no present-day value. But certainly the oases in his desert are better and more numerous than would appear at first sight. In the middle of a rhetorical and unattractive passage we often come across some striking idea or phrase, and if anyone desires to make a collection of these, it is dangerous for him to read too carelessly even the most uninviting sections. On the other hand, these striking phrases and ideas have sometimes a peculiar disappointment of their own. We feel now and then as if Philo let them escape him unawares, as if he were unconscious of his own merits. When he seems just on the point of developing something of lasting value, as often as not the fine idea is not worked out, and the telling phrase is succeeded by a mass of platitudes or aridities. Still, that is no reason why these isolated gems should not be rescued from their unattractive surroundings.

If Philo is often striking, it does not follow that he is helpful. Nor is that which is striking, even in the ethical and religious sphere, of necessity available for homiletical ends. But it may be striking all the same. It is, moreover, in grand generalities that Philo excels; his ethical details are few and disappointing.

His readers must remember two things more. Professor Jowett has said that "no one can duly appreciate the Dialogues of Plato who has not a sympathy with mysticism." Now the same warning applies to Philo. In spite of his lack of poetic sensibility and proportion, Philo is deeply

Philo and the Greeks.

Philo and Mysticism.

imbued with the characteristic yearnings and qualities of the mystic. It was partly through him and his school that mysticism of a very pronounced type became a prevailing force in the last great manifestation of Greek philosophy. Not a few, then, of the passages which I shall quote, just because they *are* mystic, will appeal to some, and seem vague or foolish to others.

A second point is this. Rhetorical and long-winded as Philo is, far-fetched and turgid as his language, he was, nevertheless, tremendously in earnest. And that about which he is in earnest will seem a little strange and remote to many excellent persons. It is, to put it briefly, the know-

**Philo's
earnestness.**

ledge of God. That is his quest. Most people are perhaps too sure about God's existence to trouble themselves very much about knowing him. Such a quest lies outside their lives and is unfamiliar to them. But Philo is desperately anxious to know all that he can about the nature of God. It is a religious passion with him, and yet he seeks this knowledge by philosophic means. Even if he ends in ecstasy, his road thither lies through metaphysics. But the truly religious man realises now that the knowledge or vision of God is rarely to be attained on these lines. "The

**His
intellectualism.**

upright shall behold God's face. The pure in heart shall see God. He judged the cause of the poor and the needy—was not this to know me, saith the Lord?" It is curious that both in the Rabbinic and Alexandrian developments of Judaism, there should be a note of false intellectualism. "An empty-headed man cannot be a sin-fearing man, nor can an ignorant person be pious." So said Hillel; but the man of true religion knows better. Philo, too, speaks scornfully of the "common herd," to not one of whom has been granted a share in true life.¹ But, though he does not understand that the only—or would it be humbler to say, the surest—pathway to God leads through the gates of goodness, and though he does not appreciate the fact that for goodness wisdom is not essential, these defects do not make his own yearning for the knowledge of God less earnest and real.

Unfortunately for him, while he failed to realise the efficacy of goodness in the knowledge of God, he was also sceptical about the power of wisdom as a method by which to reach the goal. He wants to know God, to have an intellectual vision of his veritable nature, to draw near to his sovereign reality. But he is also convinced that God in the fulness and essence of his being cannot be known by man. The creature cannot grasp the Creator. If he could be fully known, God would not be God, and man would not be man. We know in part, but in part only.

**The knowledge of
God is his quest,
but God is
unknowable.**

¹ I. 611. The references are to the pages of Mangey.

Why God is not fully knowable, and what aspects of him may nevertheless be known, can be read in the books about Philo, and I am not going into these matters here. On the one hand, there is the theory of the Logos and the divine Powers ; on the other, the God-like reason of man. All I want to point out is that both elements of Philo's philosophy, the constant yearning to know God and the abiding conviction that God is unknowable, are alike absent from the mind of average humanity. At least they are not perpetually present in our consciousness. Apart, therefore, from the difficulty of his subject, we cannot properly appreciate Philo without an effort.

One word more. God is unknowable. But since, to Philo, the Pentateuch contains all truth, this truth is in the Pentateuch. Yet the Pentateuch contains all sorts of very specific statements about God. You know how Philo deals with these statements. They are allegories or accommodations. But not all of them. The *ethical* statements are true as they stand. Hence the ethical perfection of God has to be fitted in with Philo's philosophic agnosticism. How this is done is luminously explained by Dr. Drummond.

And as I have come to speak of Philo's conception of God, let me start my Florilegium at this point. That conception as a connected whole can be learnt from the text-books. I give only detached fragments of it which contain some striking phrase, expression, or idea. I may add that where I am able to make use of Dr. Drummond's translations I have freely done so. This has been more frequently the case in the earlier than in the later portions of my essay, for my first excerpts about Philo's conception of the Divine nature are almost all quoted by Dr. Drummond.

One of Philo's ideas about God which appeals to us most strongly, though we can hardly get any very clear realisation of it into our minds,

**The Divine
ubiquity.**

is that of the Divine ubiquity. Philo is very emphatic on this point. Those who take the Paradise story literally are guilty of impiety. Such a mythological tale (*μυθοποιία*) should not even enter our minds. Why should God plant a paradise ? "For not even the entire universe would be an adequate home for him, for he is a place to himself, and full of himself and sufficient to himself, filling and containing all other things, which are deficient and desert and empty, but himself being contained by nothing else, as being himself one and the whole."¹ And again, "He has reached everywhere, he looks to the ends, he has filled the universe, and of him not even the smallest thing is desert."²

Like many of us to-day, Philo is desperately anxious to maintain, and

¹ I. 52 (Dr. II. 29).

² I. 220 (Dr. II. 42).

if possible, to explain at once the transcendence and the immanence of God. Thus, for example, he can be regarded either as everywhere or as nowhere; "nowhere, because he generated place along with the bodies which occupy it, and we may not assert that that which has made is contained in any of the things produced; everywhere, because having stretched his powers through earth and water, air and heaven, he has left no part of the universe desert, but, having collected all things together, made them fast with invisible bonds, that they might never be dissolved."¹ "God," he tells us elsewhere, "is not in time or place, but above them both, for having all created things under himself, he is contained by nothing, but is outside of all. And yet, though above and outside creation, he has, none the less, filled creation (τὸν κόσμον) with himself."² The analogy of the human mind to the human body does not properly apply to the relation of God to the world, for we have not created our bodies, but God has created the world. "He does not only penetrate through and pass beyond the universe by his mind, but also by his essence."³ There is only one sense in which he who is "not only here but there and elsewhere and everywhere," may be said to be more in one place than in another. It is not that, like a body, he occupies one place by leaving another, but that he uses an "intensive motion."⁴ Philo, as Dr. Drummond says, seems to mean that "though God remains immovable in his omnipresence, yet his power may be manifested with varying intensity in different places, just as he is said to dwell in the purified soul as in a house, because his watchful providence is most conspicuous there."⁵

The Transcendence and Immanence of God.

Philo's views respecting the transcendence and immanence of God may be profitably compared with the theology of the Stoics and of Aristotle. Whereas most workers come to Philo from the Greeks, Jewish students may perhaps come to the Greeks through Philo. Though this would be to reverse the order of time and logical sequence, it would be very interesting to know the impression which Philo made upon an open-eyed and open-minded student who knew his Old Testament and his Talmud, but was unacquainted with Greek philosophy.

Philo considers the Deity to be as much above the limitations of time as he is above the limitations of space. This conception is not profitable for any except professed students of philosophy, and I will

¹ I. 425 (Dr. II. 41).

² I. 229.

³ οὐκ ἐπινούϊα μόνον ἐπεξεληλυθῆναι ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ οὐσιώδει. I. 466.

⁴ I. 176.

⁵ Dr. II. 43.

only quote a part of one passage, which has been also specially dwelt upon by Dr. Drummond. "God is the creator of time nothing is future to him, to whom the limits of time are subjected, for his life is not time, but eternity, the archetype and pattern of time. And in eternity nothing is either past or future, but only present."¹ Very similar is a passage in Plutarch: "We must not say of God that he was or will be but only that he is. And he is not in regard to time, but to changeless and timeless eternity, in which there is no after or before, sooner or later. For God being one, by one *now* has filled the 'Ever.' In him is no 'has been' or 'will be,' he is without beginning and without end."²

The Omnipresent Deity is naturally conceived as supremely perfect. Here the philosopher agrees with the humblest believer. But Philo

**The Divine
Perfection.**

expands and interprets this idea of perfection in more than one interesting way. Using a well-known term in Greek philosophy, he declares that God is all sufficing to himself (*αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ*). "He is full of himself and sufficient for himself, both before creation and after it. For he is changeless, and needs no other thing at all, for all things are his, but he does not belong to anything."³ The reasons because of which finite beings need other finite beings such as themselves do not apply to God, for he possesses all things in himself by the infinite resources of his manifold nature. "He is all the most precious things to himself, kindred, relation, friend, virtue, blessedness, happiness, knowledge, understanding, beginning, end, whole, all, judge, opinion, counsel, law, action, sovereignty."⁴ This rather incongruous list of the Divine perfections is characteristic of the wilder or more unrestrained moments of Philo's style. Rhetorical, but yet more reasonable is the following: "God is the first good, all beautiful, blessed and happy, or, if one is to speak the truth, he is better than the good, happier than happiness, more beautiful than beauty, more blessed than blessedness, and whatever is more perfect than these."⁵

As all things are God's and the apparent possessions of the creature are but temporary gifts and loans, Philo insists that "God is the only true citizen (*πολίτης*), while all created beings are sojourners and strangers."⁶ Whatever is most desired and excellent

¹ I. 277 (Dr. II. 45).

² *De Ei apud Delphos*, XX. The passage is also quoted by Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, p. 242; cf. Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen*, III. 2 (3rd Ed.), p. 168, n. 4, for the relation between Philo and Plutarch.

³ I. 582 (Dr. II. 48); II. 194.

⁴ I. 128 (Dr. II. 49).

⁵ II. 546 (Dr. II. 31).

⁶ I. 161.

in humanity, Philo essays to prove is only fully realised in God. Thus, for instance, "God alone is the most absolute and real peace, but begotten and corruptible matter is all continual war."¹ Again, "God alone truly feasts. For he alone rejoices and alone is glad and alone has good cheer, and to him alone does it belong to keep peace unmixed with war. He is without pain and without fear and unparticipant of evils, unyielding, unharmed, unwearied, full of pure blessedness. His nature is most perfect, or rather God is himself the summit and end and boundary of blessedness, sharing in nothing else with a view to his own improvement, but communicating what is peculiarly his own to all individual beings from the fountain of the beautiful, himself."² These descriptions of the Divine nature might profitably be compared and contrasted with the striking conception of God's character and life in the twelfth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Aristotle is more guarded and restrained in his language: his notion of the Divine blessedness restricts itself to the intellectual ideal of pure thought, feeding, as it were, upon itself; but he, too, as Schwegeler points out, is roused out of his customary and severe serenity by the conception of the infinite bliss of him from whom "heaven and nature depend."

Aristotle, on the other hand, removes God farther from the world than Philo. The Aristotelian God, whose own eternal activity is a *νόησις νοήσεως*, pure thought returning upon itself, may be the Prime Motor of the world, but lives his independent life. But Philo's God is not only

God's relation to the World.

a God of thought but also a God of goodness; and, therefore, though Philo may theoretically describe his life as the same both before creation and after it, we can hardly conceive the God of Philo as ever existing without a universe on which to manifest the creative and moral aspects of his many-sided Being. Indeed, Philo asserts God to be always creating. "God never ceases to create, but as it is the property of fire to burn, and of snow to cause cold, so also it is the property of God to create."³ But this ceaseless activity is consonant with the idea of absolute rest. Rest merely means the absence of fatigue, and if you can imagine a perpetual work combined with absolute freedom from effort and weariness, you would have combined in a single conception the idea of activity and the idea of repose. This is precisely the case with God. "God alone truly rests, but his rest is not inactivity—since the cause of all is by nature active, and never ceases from creating the most beautiful things—but the most unlaborious energy, without distress, and with amplest ease."⁴

¹ I. 692 (Dr. II. 53).

³ I. 44.

² I. 154 (Dr. II. 49).

⁴ I. 154 (Dr. II. 53).

The real cause of creation could be conceived as inherent in the necessities of the Divine nature. God being as naturally creative as fire is "naturally hot," he must always have objects on which to exercise his providence and his goodness. Philo, however, does not venture to go as far as this, which would be an infringement upon the Divine *αὐτάρκεια*—upon God's all-sufficiency to himself. "Why, then, did he create that which was not before? Because he was good and bounteous."¹ For "God creates nothing for himself, for he needs nothing; but he creates everything for the creature who is in need of receiving it."² Müller has pointed out that, though Philo himself quotes a famous passage in Plato's *Timæus*, to the effect that God made the world because he was good, and desired that "all things should be as like himself as they could be," yet God's goodness probably meant to Plato something different from what it meant to Philo.³ To Philo God's goodness is essentially ethical. It is equivalent to God's grace, which he also repeatedly declares to be the cause of creation. Thus he says, "For the just man seeking the nature of all things makes this one most excellent discovery, that all things are due to the grace of God. Creation can give nothing, for it owns nothing. To God alone grace is native. To those who ask the origin of creation, one could most rightly reply that it is the goodness and grace of God which he bestowed on the race which is after his image. For all that is in the universe and the universe itself are the gift and bounty and grace of God."⁴ The inherent necessity of the Divine nature to display creative beneficence is clearly indicated in another passage, where Philo says: "All is due to God's grace, though nought is worthy of it; but God looked to his own eternal goodness, and considered that to do good befitted his own blessed and happy nature."⁵

So far as to creation in general. As to the gloomier side of it, Philo has nothing to say worth repeating. His championship of the Divine providence, and his explanations of evil in the *De Providentia*, assuming that this treatise has been proved genuine by Wendland, are little more than excerpts from the Stoics, and show no trace of having been transfigured in the process of adoption.⁶ They are, therefore, valuable as throwing light on Stoical doctrine, but give us little or nothing specifically characteristic of Philo. In one passage else-

¹ I. 585.² I. 147.³ *Timæus*, 29 E, 30 A, quoted in Philo, I. 5. Müller's edition of the *De Mundi Opificio*, p. 156 seq.⁴ I. 102 *fin.*⁵ I. 288 *fin.* Cf. a curious passage in Plutarch's *De Defectu Oraculorum*, XXIV.⁶ Cf. Dr. II. 58.

where he just touches upon the question why the perfect God produced an imperfect world. Is the inanimate world—is even the body, the source of so much evil, if not evil itself—created by the goodness of God? Philo does not venture to say that God created what seems to us evil; but he does say that inanimate nature, as well as all living things, were made by God's goodness, and not merely by the sheer exercise of irresponsible authority: "For the manifestation of the better there was necessary the creation and existence of the worse; but both are due alike to the power of the same goodness, namely, to God."¹

As regards the ethical perfections of God, Philo does not, or cannot, go beyond the utterances of the Prophets and the Psalter. A few passages are perhaps worthy of notice. God, as Ruler and Lord of the Universe, and as endowed **God's goodness.** with free will, has the power of doing good and the power of doing harm; but his *will* is only to do good. When he is called Everlasting God, this implies that he gives his gifts, not on some occasions only, or intermittently, but always and unceasingly, that he adds grace to grace and blessing to blessing, in an inexhaustible and continuous supply.² Elsewhere he says, "God is not a salesman (*πωλητήρ*), lowering the price (*ἐπευωνίζων*) of his own possessions, but the bestower of all things, pouring forth the ever-flowing fountains of favours, not desiring a recompense; for neither is he in need himself, nor is any created thing competent to bestow a gift in return."³ He has a fine conceit about God's mercy: "In order that mankind may continue to exist, he mingles mercy with judgment, and he not only pities after he has judged, but he judges after he has pitied, for with him pity is older than judgment, seeing that he knows those who are worthy of punishment, not after judgment but before it."⁴

As God is the cause of good, and of good only, Philo is rather uneasy in his mind on the subject of Divine punishment and retribution. He vacillates. Punishment—even if regarded as a corrective, and therefore as a good—has yet in it some resemblance or imitation of evil (*τὸ μιμητάζον ἀγαθὸν κακῷ, ἢ τιμωρία*). Hence its execution is entrusted to certain subordinate ministers and agents, even as man himself, because a creature who can choose evil as well as good, was not fashioned by God alone.⁵ Thus, when the calamitous and evil aspect of "punishment" is considered, Philo tends to dissociate it from

**Theory of
Divine benefits
and punishments.**

¹ I. 101.

² I. 342.

³ I. 161 (Dr. II. 50); cp. Milton, "God does not need either man's work or his own gifts."

⁴ I. 284.

⁵ I. 555-557; cp. I. 16, and I. 432, and Dr. II. 139-155.

God (as if the problem of evil were made one whit easier by any hypothesis of ministering angels or opposing devils) ; when he looks upon it as a good, he tends to take it up into the sum of the Divine forces, which are themselves aspects or manifestations of God's nature and being. In such moods he does not hesitate to speak of the punishing powers of God, because they merge with the Divine beneficence. "Perhaps," he says, "we should include the punitive among the beneficent powers, not merely because they are parts of laws—and law is made up of two parts, the honour of the good, and the punishment of the wicked—but because punishment often admonishes and makes temperate the sinners themselves, and if not them, at least their associates. For the punishments of others make the ordinary race of men better, for they fear to suffer the like."¹ But no one can say that this is very original or suggestive.

He is more interesting on the theory that both God's grace and his punishments are proportionate to the nature which has to enjoy the one or to suffer the other. Thus he says, "The Creator, knowing the natural weakness of created things, does not desire to benefit or chastise them to the limits of his own power, but only according to the power which he sees in those who are to partake of either punishment or benefaction."² In the creation of man, God did not look to "the greatness of his own graces—for these are boundless and not to be circumscribed—but to the capacities of the recipient. For the creature cannot receive in the same proportion that God can give ; for his powers exceed measure. But the creature being too weak to receive of his gifts, would have sunk under the burden, if God had not meted out his benefits in due proportion and measure suitable to each."³ Another ingenious idea of his is that even a constant series of benefits would cause surfeit and irritation. The same thought, on a higher plane, is hinted at by Tennyson : "God fulfils himself in many ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the world." "Therefore God restrains a first kind of benefits lest the recipients should be satiated with them and grow wanton, and dispenses a second sort instead of the first, and then a third instead of the second, and in general, new kindnesses in the place of old, sometimes different and sometimes the same. For the creature is never wholly without a share in God's graces, for otherwise he would utterly be destroyed, but it cannot endure them in one plentiful and abundant rush."⁴

There is also found a further application of the idea to man's knowledge of God. Here the student will at once notice a parallel to a favourite notion of some modern theologians, that God's revelation of himself is gradual and proportionate. Thus, in answer to the

¹ II. 546.² I. 285 *init.*³ I. 5.⁴ I. 254.

urgent request of Moses, "Show me thyself," God replies, "I can but reveal what it is possible for you to receive. Human nature cannot attain to a full knowledge of the Divine being."¹ And elsewhere Philo remarks, "God does not pronounce his oracles (*χρησμοί*) in proportion to the greatness of his own eloquence (*λογιότης*), but to the power of those who are to be helped by them."²

Though these sayings of Philo need adaptation to the expanded thought of our own time, they are undeniably suggestive. Not less so are some of his notions about the Biblical anthropomorphisms. These too, according to Philo, are an accommodation to human weakness and human needs. He frequently observes that there are two apparently contradictory statements in the Scripture about God: "He is as man," "He is not as man," of which the second is truer than the first. Yet the first is the basis of many Biblical sayings. The general reason for this is the familiar one, that man, if he wishes to allege anything about God beyond the mere fact of his existence, cannot avoid human analogies. "We cannot," says Philo, "get out of ourselves, and so we get our conceptions of the uncreated God from our own attributes."³ At the same time this human incapacity is made to subserve a purpose of instruction. "We cannot constantly store up in our soul the verse, so worthy of the Cause, 'God is not as man,' so as to escape all anthropomorphic expressions; but generally participating in the mortal, and unable to think of anything apart from ourselves, or to escape from our own destinies, sunk in the mortal like snails, and wrapt in a ball like hedgehogs round ourselves, we form our thoughts both about the Blessed and Incorruptible and about ourselves, shrinking from the absurdity of statement, that the Divine is in the human shape, but setting up again the impiety in fact, that he is subject to human passions. Therefore we attribute to him hands, feet, ingress, egress, enmities, alienations, wrath,—parts and passions inappropriate to the Cause."⁴ Among these "parts and passions," Philo reckons the oath. The Bible makes God swear in order that it may both "confute and console our weakness." That is to say, we shall believe an oath among ourselves the better, if God himself is supposed to employ it. But more specifically Philo limits the notion of anthropomorphisms to those terms which speak of God as angry and jealous, or to those which seem designed to threaten and terrify. Expressions which rouse our fear he regards as entirely educational, and his observations about them are curious and suggestive.

**Biblical Anthropomorphisms :
their cause and
purpose.**

¹ II. 218.

² I. 253.

³ I. 419.

⁴ I. 181 *fn.*, 182 (Dr. II. 12).

There are some men, he says, so dull in nature (*ἀμβλεῖς*) that they cannot form any conception of God without a body. We must be content if such persons can be restrained from sin by the fear produced through anthropomorphic descriptions of God.¹ Philo thus characteristically associates a low intellectual conception of the Divine nature with an imperfect morality and an imperfect service of God. In another elaborate passage he insists that passions such as anger or regret are wholly inapplicable and foreign to the Divine nature. That they are found in the Pentateuch is for the object of "admonishing those who could not otherwise be brought to a sober frame of mind (*σωφρονίζεσθαι*)."² Philo can no more sever truth from goodness than error from moral evil. They who, by defect of nature or education, cannot "see acutely" into the "true mysteries" of God are "intractable and foolish servants" in practical life. They cannot be helped by truth, for they are unable to appreciate it. Let them learn, unwillingly, through false terrors, by fear. The "passions and diseases" of the soul are at once intellectual and moral. To Philo, no less than to the author of the Fourth Gospel, the two are inextricably blended together. He cannot distinguish the one from the other, so that two things which to ourselves seem wholly alien are identical to him. These mental and moral diseases (for they are both in one) could best be healed if Moses represented God "as using threats and indignation and inexorable wrath and weapons for attack upon evil-doers, for thus only is the fool admonished." And then, just as he has connected anthropomorphic beliefs with the fear of God, so he proceeds to connect the love of God with the truer, more spiritual conception of the Divine nature. "With the two fundamental assertions, God is as man, and God is not as man, two other fundamental principles seem closely interwoven and akin: fear and love. For all the exhortations to piety by means of the laws depend either on the fear or on the love of God. To those, then, who do not in thought ascribe to God either part or passion of man, but worthily honour him on account of himself alone, love is most appropriate, but to all others, fear."³

In spite of these divisions Philo makes no absolute chasm and gulf between man and man. He had the philosopher's customary contempt for the vulgar herd, he bewails the infinite number of bad men and the paucity or even absence of the good (I. 64, 585, 611), but he does not anywhere imply that there is any natural or predetermined barrier by which those who, in his own language, are the servants of the body may not become servants of the soul. "Every man," he says, "as regards his mind, is

**But no
absolute gulf
or difference
of kind
between
man and man.**

¹ I. 283. (Dr. II. 14).

² I. 656.

related to the Divine reason, for he is an impress or fragment or radiance of that blessed nature.”¹ If it be asked why this privilege was conferred upon man, whose mixed and earthly composition was apparently unworthy of so high a distinction, and who often uses it to such ignoble ends, Philo replies that “God being bountiful loves to bestow good on all men, even on those who are not perfect, urging them to the desire and attainment of virtue. So he displays his exceeding wealth of riches, which suffice even for those who will gain no great benefit from them. Hence he has made no soul barren (*ἄγονος*) of good, even if the use of good be impossible to some.”² Elsewhere he says: “The powers of God are ubiquitous not merely for the benefit of pre-eminent men, but also of those who seem to be insignificant. To them, too, God gives what harmonises with the capacity and measure of their souls, for he measures out with equal rule what is proportionate to each.”³ None are of necessity quite shut out from a glimpse of the Highest. “Who is there so without reason and soul, as never, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to conceive a notion of God? For a sudden apparition (*φαντασία*) of the good frequently flits past even the wickedest, but they cannot retain or keep a hold on it. For it quickly passes away from those who have come to dwell with it when they have lived beyond the bounds of law and justice, as indeed it would never have visited them at all if it were not to convict those who choose evil instead of good.”⁴ However rhetorically Philo may talk of the endless number of the bad, there is no necessity, according to his psychology, for assuming any wide and fixed cleavage among humanity, between children of God on one side and children of the devil upon the other. “In every man,” he says in another passage, “even in quite ordinary persons, there is an instinctive hatred of vice (*μισοπρόνηρον πάθος*) and this innate passion when roused makes its owner a champion and defender of anyone who seems to be wronged.”⁵ He is tolerant enough to admit that lack of opportunity may often account for lack of visible excellence. To him, as to the Greeks, opportunity (*καιρός*), if not Divine, is at least the companion of Deity. “Virtue has been, is, and will always be, but it is, perchance, obscured by unfavourable circumstances (*ἀκαιρία*), and again revealed by opportunity, the servant of God.”⁶ Many a sinner and many a hero is unable to display either his wickedness or his virtue. Many men are born with capacities for wisdom, self-restraint, or justice, but “the beauty of the images in their minds they are unable to reveal through their poverty or obscurity, or through bodily disease or some other of the many misfor-

The power of opportunity.

¹ I. 35.

² I. 50.

³ I. 614.

⁴ I. 265.

⁵ II. 312.

⁶ I. 455.

tunes which attend upon the life of man. The good they have is, as it were, cabined and confined. But if the temperate man, for example, be possessed of wealth, he can show that riches, which are usually blind and provocative of luxury, may be "seeing" by his use of them Without these opportunities, virtues may exist, but they are immoveable, like silver and gold, treasured up in unknown recesses of the earth, and of no use to mankind." ¹ Philo, therefore, adopts the Platonic paradox that the good fortune of the wicked is their deepest calamity. "For weakness and impotence are profitable to the bad, just as abundance and strength are most advantageous to the good." ²

In one passage even, just after he has refused to the "common herd" any share in true life, he well points out how all kinds of lives, and not only the philosopher's, may be consecrated

**Every kind of life
may be dedicated
to God.**

to God. The thought comes to him, it must be owned, indirectly. It is a corollary of his favourite theory, on which he delights to insist, that all our faculties and powers, as well as all our surroundings and possessions, are the gift of God, and in no wise our own. "Moses has shown that we should all confess our gratitude for the powers we possess: The wise man should dedicate his sagacity, the eloquent man should devote his excellence of speech by the praise of God in prose and verse; and, in general, the natural philosopher should offer his physics, the moralist his ethics, the artist and the man of science the arts and sciences they know. So, too, the sailor and the pilot will dedicate their favourable voyage, the husbandman his fruitful harvest, the herdsman the increase of his cattle, the doctor the recovery of his patients, the general his victory in fight, and the statesman or the monarch his legal chieftaincy or kingly rule. In a word, he who is no lover of self (*ὁ μὴ φιλαυτός*) will regard God as the true cause of all the powers of body and soul and of all external goods. Let no one, therefore, however humble and insignificant he be, despairing of a better fortune, scruple to become a suppliant of God. Even if he can expect nothing more, let him give thanks to the best of his power for what he has already received. Infinite are the gifts he has: birth, life, nurture, soul, sensation, imagination, desire, reason. Reason is a small word, but a most perfect thing, a fragment of the world-soul,

¹ I. 398. Cp. Seneca *De Vita Beata*, xxii.; "Quis autem dubii est, quin haec major materia sapienti viro sit animus explicandi suum in divitiis quam in paupertate, quum in hac unum genus virtutis sit non inclinari nec deprimi, in divitiis et temperantia et liberalitas et diligentia et dispositio et magnificentia campum habet patentem." Hence the wise man:—non amat divitias, sed mavult! non in animum illas, sed in domum recipit!

² I. 430.

or, as for the disciples of the Mosaic philosophy it is more pious to say, a true impression of the Divine image."¹

This more human touch is not frequent in Philo. It may perhaps be noted again in his appreciation of honest failure in the quest of highest good. He marks its value, and offers a true consolation: "Labour in the pursuit of that which is perfectly good, even if it fail to reach the goal, is sufficient of itself to benefit the labourer."² And

The value of Failure in the quest of God.

elsewhere he says: "We sympathise with those who, loving God, seek after him, even if they find him not; for the search for the good, even if it miss its end, is able of itself to cause great joy."³ So, once more: "If in your quest for God you will find him is uncertain, for to many persons he has not made himself known, and their toil has found no consummation; but the mere search for him has given them a share in what is good; for impulses towards excellence, though they fail to attain their end, give joy to those who have them."⁴

The search for God: that, according to Philo, is the life-work of man. All else is environment and accessory. That search is also service, and the method of both is philosophy. To

Two fundamental requirements in the search for God.

reach the goal, or even to advance along the road, there are two fundamental requirements. Of these the first is common to Philo with the Platonists and the Stoics, though he carries it a point further than it yet had reached. It may be summed up as the depreciation of the body and the exaltation of the mind or soul. (To Philo there is no such separation of the moral and intellectual life as is habitual to ourselves.) To *γένησις*, that is, to what comes and goes, is born and dies,

The first is: Repression of the Body, of Pleasure, and of γένησις.

imperfection—on one side manifesting itself as error, on the other side as wickedness—is inevitably attached. Because we are material—and therefore transitory—we are of necessity sinful. But because we also bear within us an immaterial and divine image, we are capable of goodness and knowledge and the vision of God. Hence the body is, if not the cause, at all events the accessory, of all sin. Desire and pleasure are the sources of evil. "The body is wicked by nature, a plotter against the soul." It is a dead thing, and we have ever to carry a corpse about with us. So, too, said Epictetus, and the great Emperor quotes him approvingly. We get from Philo the customary tirades against the fleeting pleasures of sense, against glory and ambition and riches and outward show and worldly pomp. For the soul to live the body must die. To love the unbegotten, one must despise everything which partakes of *γένεσις*, which comes and passes

¹ I. 612.

² I. 186.

³ I. 230.

⁴ I. 96.

away, "The lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the vain glory of life." It is a thought which is common to all higher religions and to a hundred philosophies: it is a truth—or at least it contains a truth—expressed in endless tongues and endless fashions. Its rhetorical form and longwinded exaggerations may irritate us in Philo; but in the last resort we are bound to acknowledge that between a noble utterance such as, "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him," and the most turgid fulminations against "the body" in Philo, the difference is one of form: the thought remains substantially the same.

In Philo, as in many other of the later philosophers, as to some extent even in Plato, there lurks a measure of asceticism. "Plain living" has always been associated with "high thinking." The exact amount of this asceticism is disputed. The true answer only partly depends upon the authenticity of the treatise *Quod omnis probus liber*; it depends rather upon which set of certain inconsistent passages one should lay the greater stress, and regard as more truly Philonic. On the one hand Philo maintains that the ideal is not merely moderation of passion, but its absolute excision and death;¹ he bids men fly from the polluted prison-house, the body, and from its keepers, pleasure and desire, to die to the life of sense that they may partake of incorporeal and incorruptible life with God.² He inveighs against the luxury of elegant Alexandrian life, of which he gives a somewhat vivid picture. He describes the costly extravagance in food and drink and apparel, the golden goblets and the golden crowns, and even the golden beds. "The legs of the beds are of ivory, or, at a great expense of money and labour and time, they are adorned with rich mother-of-pearl or inlaid with variegated tortoiseshell. And some are all of silver or all of gold, set with precious stones, brocaded with flowers and golden embroideries, as if for display and not for use."³ No persons who indulge in senseless luxury such as this can be "pupils of the sacred word." They only are "true men, lovers of temperance and order and reverence, who have laid the foundations of their lives in self-restraint and endurance and contentment, as the safe harbourage of their souls where they can lie at anchor without risk or harm. They are superior to money and pleasure and glory; they despise food and drink except in so far as to ward off the violence of hunger. They are most ready to endure hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and all other

¹ I. 113. *Μωυσῆς . . . οὐ μετριοπάθειαν ἀλλὰ συνδύως ἀπάθειαν ἀγαπῶν*. From another point of view, however, we find Philo marvelling at those philosophers who say that virtue is ἀπάθεια. I. 603 *fin*.

² I. 437, 264.

I. 666.

trials in the pursuit and acquisition of virtue. They like best what is most easily provided, so that they are not ashamed of cheap apparel, but on the contrary, think extravagance in dress a great reproach and hindrance. To them the soft ground is a costly bed, their mattresses are bushes, grass and leaves ; a stone, or a mound of earth is their pillow.”¹

As God needs nothing and has all so the bad man is ever insatiate, always thirsting for what he has not got. The good man, on the other hand, bordering both on mortal and immortal nature, has some needs because he owns a body ; but they are few and simple because “ his soul desires immortality.”² “ One should practise oneself, therefore, to need little. For this is to be very near to God.”³ Ambition is the “ last infirmity.” “ Some say that the last thing the wise man puts off is the cloak of vainglory. For even if he has conquered all other passions, he is liable to be worsted by ambition and the praise of the multitude.”⁴ The lovers of self and sense are made to describe the righteous as “ usually inglorious and despicable, lowly persons in want of life’s necessities, less honoured than dependents or even slaves, sordid, pale and cadaverous, hungry-looking and ill-fed, very sickly, practising how to die.”⁵

But many passages could be cited which serve apparently to preach an opposite doctrine. The truth is that the highest life to Philo, as to Aristotle, was contemplative rather than practical. The lonely thinker, rather than the active philanthropist or busy statesman, is their ideal, and asceticism consorts with isolation ; but to both philosophers alike the life of action is the indispensable prelude and preparation to the life of thought. Philo was too acute a psychologist not to realise the place of pleasure among the springs of action. “ The bad man,” he says, “ treats pleasure as the *summum bonum* ; the good man, as a necessity. For without pleasure nothing happens among mortals.”⁶ Several times he urges that there is a false as well as a true temperance ; perhaps it might be more correct to say, a false as well as a true asceticism. This he calls “ niggardly and illiberal,” by means of which you will no more reach true temperance than you can gain piety by superstition, or become wise through craft. “ If you see anyone refusing to eat or drink at the customary

**There is a false
as well as a true
Asceticism.**

¹ I. 639. Not without dignity is his description of the “ higher life,”
αὐστηρὸν καὶ ἐπιστημονικὸν βίον, γέλωτος καὶ παιδιᾶς ἀμέτοχον, συννοίας
καὶ φροντίδων καὶ πόνων μεστὸν, φίλὸν τοῦ θεωρεῖν, ἀμαθίας ἐχθρὸν, χρημί-
των μὲν καὶ δόξης καὶ ἡδονῶν κρείττω, ἤττω δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ
βλέποντος οὐ τυφλοῦ πλούτου. I. 479 *fin.*, 480 ; cp. II. 163.

² II. 377.

³ II. 666.

⁴ II. 668.

⁵ I. 198.

⁶ I. 70.

times, or to wash and anoint his body, or neglecting his clothes, or sleeping on the ground in the open air, and in these ways simulating self-control, you should pity his delusion, and show him the path by which self-control may really be attained. All that he has done is ineffectual and wearisome labour, ruining both soul and body by hunger and other evils.”¹ This seems written in a different tone from that other passage quoted before, in which they who make the ground their bed and a stone their pillow are extolled as true pupils of the Sacred Word.

Philo admits that evildoers are mainly men of wealth and repute ; but he gives curious reasons, partly prudential and partly moral, why wealth and honour and social enjoyments should not be avoided by the good, or by those who are seeking for the highest life. Because you see the wicked thinking much of riches, pleasure and renown, and praising injustice as the source of all these things, do not he says, “turn in the very contrary direction, and pursue a life of poverty and lowliness, or one of severity and isolation. You will thereby only irritate your adversary, and arm a bitterer foe against you. Apply yourself not to the same actions as he, but to their sources, to honour, office, wealth, possessions, and the various beauties of colour and form.”² The object in each case is to show up the wicked man—to “convict” him, in Philo’s own language (διδάσκειν), by making the right use of the material through which he displays his villainy, licentiousness, or intemperance. The money he either hoards or wastes you will use in gifts to the poor, in dowries to the daughters of impoverished parents, and in services and donations to the State. At a banquet the glutton will make himself ridiculous to all, but you will put him to shame by your moderation, while, even if you are pressed to indulgence, you will never turn pleasure into disgust, but “if one may say so, you will be drunk with sobriety”³ (νηφάλια μεθυσθήσῃ). But at this point Philo gives, as it were, a higher turn and a nobler basis to his argument. He must have been acquainted with false Stoics and hypocritical

¹ I. 195. Cp. from a slightly different point of view, Seneca, *Ep.* I. 5 : “Illud autem te admoneo, ne eorum more, qui non proficere sed conspici cupiunt, facias aliqua quæ in habitu tuo aut genere vitæ notabilia sint. Asperum cultum et intonsum caput et neglegentiorē barbā et indictum argento odium et cubile humi positum... evita.”

² I. 549 *fin.*, 550.

³ I. 550. This would not have sounded so absurd to Philo’s contemporaries, or to our own great-grandfathers, as it sounds to ourselves. It was solemnly debated among the Stoics whether the wise man may get drunk ; and the same discussion is taken up by Philo, I. 350 *seq.* Cf. Arnim, *Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria* (1888).

ascetics, such as Lucian laughed to scorn in a later age, for his denunciation of them seems more pointed than usual, and was probably drawn from life. "Truth would rightly blame those, who, without due examination, abandon the pursuits and avocations of ordinary life, and say they have learnt to despise reputation and pleasure. It is an empty boast. They do not really despise them, but they put forward their sordid and solemn looks, and their seemingly austere and hard life as baits, so as to seem true lovers of moderation, temperance and self-denial. But they cannot deceive those who are not led away by outside show, but look more closely within. . . . Let us say to such people, 'You profess to love a life of solitude. What social virtues did you show before? You disdain money. When you were engaged in business, did you ever seek to act justly? You pretend to neglect the pleasures of the senses. Did you show moderation when you had the opportunity? You despise honour. When you were in office did you show humility? You laugh at the State, not perceiving how useful the thing is. Did you first practise and inure yourselves in the private and public affairs of life, and having become good citizens and householders by your excellence in the twin virtues of politics and economics, did you then only emigrate to a better and higher life?' For we must work our way through the 'practical' life before we come to the life of contemplation; the contest of the one must precede the higher contest of the other. It is thus we can escape the charge of laziness and indifference. So the Levites were commanded to discharge their offices till they were fifty, and only when released from their practical service might they consider and investigate the nature of things, receiving this other kind of life, which finds its only satisfaction in knowledge and contemplation, as a reward for the adequate fulfilment of their practical duties. In fine, it is necessary that they who would concern themselves with things Divine should first of all have discharged the duties of man. It is great folly to think we can reach a comprehension of the greater when we are unable to overcome the less. Be first known by your excellence in things human, in order that you may apply yourselves to excellence in things Divine."¹ In modern words: although mysticism, as a mode of life or psychical condition, is higher in the scale than philanthropy, you must become a first-rate philanthropist before you can become a first-rate mystic.

**The service of
man must
precede the
uninterrupted
service of God.**

No one will fail to compare this passage of Philo with the Republic of Plato. A few lines lower down in the same treatise (the *De Profugis*), he asserts that "the noblest contest for man is the service

¹ I. 551.

of God." The service of God is not identical with the service of man, but has a special sphere of its own. It is a *βίος* by itself. But if noblest, it is also hardest. We have a tendency to suppose that a life such as that of a busy statesman is infinitely harder than the life of the philosopher or the religious recluse. Philo would hold the contrary. "Hence," he says, "if, with inadequate purification, thinking we have washed off the defilements of life, we advance to the outer court of this Divine service, we spring back from it more quickly than we came, unable to endure its austerity, the sleepless devotion, the constant and unwearying toil. For the present, then, we should avoid equally the worst life and the best."¹

"Human virtue," as he elsewhere says, "must walk upon the earth and yet must aim at heaven."² In his treatise on the Ten Commandments, he points out that the first four "words" relate to God, and the last five to man, while the fifth is the bridge between the two, because "the nature of parents seems to lie on the borders of the human and the Divine. It is human by reason of its kinship to men and the other animals, and through the perishableness of the body; it is Divine because the function of generation resembles God, the generator of all." He then goes on to make the following shrewd remark: "Some people, attaching themselves to one portion of the Decalogue, seem to neglect the other. For filled with the unmixed draught of religious yearning, they have bid farewell to all other occupations, and have dedicated their whole life to the service of God. But those who

**The perfectly
virtuous are ex-
clusive lovers
of neither man
nor God.**

suppose that there is no good beyond well-doing towards man, care only for human intercourse, and by their social zeal share their possessions with their fellows, and seek to alleviate distress to the utmost of their power. Now both the exclusive lovers of man, and the exclusive lovers of God, we may rightly call half-perfect in virtue. The perfectly virtuous are they who excel in both."³

In his more sober moments, Philo fully recognises the social nature of man. In one place he even goes so far as to speak of the few who have been inspired with a divine madness, as made semi-savage by their ecstasy (*οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τὴν ἔνθεον μανίαν μανέντες ἐξηγρώθησαν*). With

¹ I. 552.

² I. 478.

³ II. 199. Cp. the very striking passage in Antoninus, III. 13 (A man should do all things, even the smallest, remembering the bond (*σύνδεσις*) between the human and the divine: *οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἀνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεία συναναφορᾶς εἰ πράξεις, οὔτε ἐμπαλιν*), with which Gataker aptly compares 1 Cor. x. 31, 32, and Pirke Aboth, II. 17 (Philo, I. 530 *fin.*) is partly in point also. All forms of self-control are ends in themselves, yet they are nobler (*σεμνότερα δὲ φαίνονται*), if they are practised for the honour of God (*εἰ θεοῦ τιμῆς καὶ ἀρεσκείας ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδεύουτο*).

them he contrasts those who are disciples of "a gentle and tamer wisdom, by whom religion is earnestly cultivated, and yet human duties are not neglected." Such men find favour in the eyes both of man and God.¹ It is safest to follow their guidance, fervently to honour God, but not to neglect our own nature.² Man is not born for himself alone. "Selfishness produces unsociability and impiety. Man is a social animal by nature. Therefore he must live not only for himself, but for parents, brothers, wife, children, relatives, and friends, for the members of his deme, and of his tribe, for his country, for his race, for all mankind. Nay he must live for the parts of the whole, and also for the entire world, and much more for the Father and Creator. If he is indeed possessed of reason, he must be sociable, he must love the world and God, that of God he may be beloved." "He must not deem all the world an appendage to himself, but himself an appendage to the world."³

Yet on the subject of solitude and social intercourse Philo is inconsistent. We may gather that his own philanthropy was rather in word than deed. He has seldom a good word to say for the professional statesman; like Plato, he regards him as an inharmonious person, in conflict with himself.⁴ The bad man is a busybody. He haunts the market-place, the theatre, the law courts, the council chamber, the assembly, and every meeting and concourse of men. He is a chatterer, confuses and muddles together truth with falsehood, things sacred with things profane, the serious with the comic, what is private with what is public. He is a loungeur and a lazybones, always anxious to know other people's concerns, so as to rejoice over their calamities and to envy their success. The good man, on the other hand, is said to love solitude, not that he is a misanthrope, but "because he has guarded himself against vice, which the common crowd welcome, rejoicing whereat they should grieve, and grieving whereat they should rejoice. Wherefore the good man, for the most part, shuts himself up at home, and hardly ever crosses his threshold." If he goes out, he walks in the country, and the companions he loves are the best of all mankind—the famous ones of old, "whose bodies have been dissolved by time, but whose virtues are kindled into life

**Philo's
inconsistency.**

¹ I. 584. Cp. Antoninus, VI. 30, "Reverence the gods and help men : short is life : there is only one fruit of this earthly life, a holy disposition and social acts." VII. 31, *φίλησον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος. Ἀκολούθησον θεῷ*. As a matter of fact, according to Philo, piety and philanthropy commonly go together. II. 30.

² I. 585. *θαυμάζοντες μὲν τὸν αἴτιον ὑπερφυῶς, τῆς δὲ καθ' αὐτοὺς φύσεως μὴ ὑπερορῶντες*.

³ II. 662 ; I. 275.

⁴ II. 47, etc.

by the books that tell of them in prose and verse.”¹ Socrates and Milton would have something to say to a philanthropy so barren, to a goodness so untested and untried.

Philo cannot get over an abiding contempt for the multitude and their vices. His constant feeling is that the solitary wisdom of the rapt theosophist is higher than the “gregarious wisdom” of human action. “Divine wisdom is a friend of solitude, for God possesses her, and God is alone, and therefore she loves aloneness. But human wisdom is tame and domestic and gregarious, she haunts the cities of mortals, and her delight is with the sons of men.”² In one passage he says that if a man really and truly wants to despise all desires, and to subdue all passions, “he must fly from home and country, and kinsmen and friends, without turning back.” Many persons, he adds, have been cured of wild desires by such “migrations,” which must, however, be migrations into solitude, for “there are snares (*δίκτυα*) in a foreign country, just like the snares at home.”³ A regular justification of eremites! But elsewhere he incidentally tells us that in his own case he has not always found solitude efficacious to thought. “I have often left my kinsmen, friends and country, and betaken myself to the desert, that I might perceive some higher vision, but it has profited me nothing. My thought, scattered or stung by passion, has not reached its goal. Sometimes, on the other hand, in a crowded assembly, I make of my mind a solitude, when God has scattered the turmoil in my soul, and taught me that it is not the difference of places that works the good or ill, but God who moves and guides the chariot of the soul wherever he prefers.”⁴

On another point in the ascetic ideal, which comes home much more to every one of us to-day, Philo is very wanting. For any explanation of sorrow, for any comfort in misfortune and misery, we may search almost in vain in all his writings. Here the Psalter on the one side, Epictetus and Seneca on the other, are far more effective and original. It is this unreality, this want of relation to the actual lives of men, which makes so much that

**The right
method
of suffering.**

¹ II. 4.

² I. 491 *init.* Cp. I. 506.

³ II. 411. Cp. Friedländer's admirable monograph, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Christenthums*, p. 83, for the bearing of this and other similar passages upon the question of the Therapeutæ and the authenticity and date of the “*De Vita Contemplativa*.”

⁴ I. 81 *fin.*, 82 *init.* The same thought occurs in Antoninus (The true “retreat” is “within”), IV. 3, and Seneca, *Ep.* 82, 104.

he has written artificial, useless and out of date. Two or three passages only seem worthy of notice. Quoting the verse in Deuteronomy, "God humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger and fed thee with manna," he remarks that this humbling was in truth propitiation. "When we are spoiled of our pleasant things and seem to be ill-treated, then in truth is God propitious."¹ But elsewhere the simple and sufficient sense of the Biblical narrative is allegorised away.² Very curious and characteristic is one other passage in which he attempts to show for what reason, and in what spirit suffering should be borne. "It is proper," he says, "for God to create and for man to suffer (πάσχειν). God gives, man receives. If we once realise that 'suffering' is proper and necessary to man, we shall easily endure whatever befalls, however grievous and burdensome it may be." Once recognise that it is ours, as it were, by right and necessity, to suffer, and we shall endure as we ought, "resisting and setting ourselves in battle against calamity, by fortifying and barricading our mind with patience and endurance, most potent of virtues." He then attempts to explain his meaning more clearly by two curious metaphors. The first is taken from shaving. A creature can be shaved in two ways, either purely passively like a sheep, or like a man where the "sufferer" reacts against the agent (this he calls τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατὰ ἀντέρπειν), and positively helps the shaver to perform his work, putting himself in the right attitude, and so on. Such a one combines "suffering" with "doing." So too in the case of beating; a slave or a freeman stretched on the wheel as a punishment of crime is purely passive, but a boxer parries the blow. We are then not to endure our calamities like the shorn sheep, or the beaten slave, but to react on destiny, since suffering is necessary for us all. "So shall we not, like effeminate persons, be broken and weakened utterly by the faintness and relaxation of our souls, but braced and strengthened in mind, we shall be able to mitigate and lighten the onset of impending ills."³

The life, then, which depreciates the body and exalts the soul is true life. "Death in life" is the lot of him who lives the slave of passion and of vice. For there are two kinds of death, one the separation of soul from body, but the other the **The two deaths.** peculiar death of the soul itself, "the ruin of virtue, the reception of vice."⁴ The true philosopher is ever practising how to die to the life of the body, that he may partake of a bodiless and incorruptible life with God."⁵ He "dies that he may live," and when he is dead in the ordinary sense, he "lives the happy life in God."⁶ "For this is the best definition of immortal life, to be filled with a spiritual

¹ I. 121.

² I. 544.

³ I. 153, 154 *init.*; cp. I. 127.

⁴ I. 65; cp. I. 200.

⁵ I. 264.

⁶ I. 200.

love of God. So the priests, Nadab and Abihu, died that they might live, exchanging mortality for life incorruptible, and departing from the creature to the unbegotten Creator.”¹ It may be noted that Philo uses the word “immortal” to denote indifferently the highest life on earth and the eternal life after death: the two ideas fade and pass into each other. There is the same half-conscious confusion in his use of the word “everlasting” (*αἰώνιος*), as where he exclaims: “Is not the taking flight to God everlasting life, and is not the running away from him death?”²

So much for the one fundamental condition for the achievement of the *summum bonum*: let me now mention the other. We not only need a

**The second
fundamental
requirement:
a particular
kind of
humility.**

a particular kind of life, but also a mental attitude; more precisely a particular kind of humility. It is primarily an intellectual humility which is required, but, quite characteristically, this merges into and includes a moral humility as well. Its contrary vice is the attribution of our own mental, moral, psychical and physical powers to ourselves, regarding man as the measure of all things, and as the independent author of whatever he feels, does and knows. Whereas, in fact, the true agent is God: God is the cause, man the instrument.³ This aberration is moral as well as intellectual: it involves not only pride and arrogance, but also selfishness. He who regards himself as the cause of his own wisdom and happiness lives for himself and not for God. Self-conceit in the mental sphere corresponds in the moral sphere to selfishness. They are merely two sides of the same shield. What appears here as *οἷσις*, appears there as *φιλαντία*.⁴

The emphasis both on word and thing—so far at least as regards *οἷσις*—seems peculiar to Philo. It is not enough for him that you

**The doctrine
of οἷσις.**

should regard your own mind as a “fragment” or “image” of the Divine. The Stoics did the same. But what he objects to is the independence of the created mind. The Stoics—in their earlier days—regarded man as a kind of separate or little deity, which once started could and did proceed wholly by itself. He could come into line with, or he could go off at an erring tangent from the world-deity, of which he was the offshoot or emanation. To Philo this Stoic position seemed to set up a false and spurious liberty. Not that he denies the freedom of the will. He asserts it strongly. Man has been given “a volitional and self-deter-

¹ I. 554 *fin.*; ὅρος ἀθανάτου βίου κάλλιστος οὗτος ἔρωτι καὶ φιλῇ θεοῦ ἀσάρκῃ καὶ ἀσωμάτῃ κατεσχησθαι.

² I. 557.

³ God is the αἴτιον, τὸ ὑφ' οὗ: man the ὄργανον, τὸ δι' οὗ. I. 162.

⁴ Cp. Dr. II. 288-292.

mining judgment," and is endowed with "voluntary and preferential energies."¹ But this very freedom is a purely arbitrary gift of God. And not only so, but all the faculties of man—physical and psychical alike—the "first movements," as he calls them, of the soul (*τὰ πρῶτα κινήματα*), in each individual as they occur, are the separate and voluntary gifts of the Creator.

The word *οἷσις* already occurs in Euripides;² and Philo quotes with approval the "proverb of the ancients," that "self-conceit is the hindrance of progress."³ It is found two or three times in Antoninus and in Epictetus, and (with *οἷμα*) some six times in Plutarch.⁴ In all these writers it is a synonym of *τῦφος*, and is equivalent to arrogance or conceit. But it is mainly applied to the intellect, and means the false belief in one's own knowledge when one is really ignorant. Philo, who apparently uses the word much more frequently than any other writer, gives it a specially religious meaning. It is the error and the vice of thinking that our knowledge and goodness are really our own, that we are the true owners of our own powers, and the true authors of all which by their help we see and do and know. *οἷσις* is that form of arrogance which has been attributed to the Stoics, and Philo, in a measure, anticipates Pascal and many another Christian theologian in its denunciation.⁵

οἷσις in Stoic philosophy.

The difference of opinion between Philo and even such later-day Stoics as Seneca and Epictetus on this subject is, I imagine, to be largely accounted for by their different conceptions of God. The Stoic pantheism was always getting the better of a humbler and more Theistic view of the relations between God and man. And Bonhöffer has shown how those passages in Epictetus which, as it would seem, speak most plainly of the need of divine help in the fight with sin or in the achievement of knowledge, must be taken with many a grain of pantheistic salt. So, too, with Seneca, who, in this as

A digression upon the alleged arrogance of the Stoics, and the meaning of it.

¹ I. 280 (Dr. I. 347-350).

² Eur. *Frag.* 644. βαρὺ τὸ φόρημ' οἷσις ἀνθρώπου κακοῦ.

³ II. 652: οἷσις, ὡς ὁ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγος, ἐστὶν ἐκκοπή προκοπῆς. ὁ γὰρ κατοιομενὲς βελτίωσιν οὐκ ἀνέχεται. This proverb is attributed by Stobæus to Bion, by others to Heraclitus. Cp. Ed. Bywater, p. 51, under "Spuria."

⁴ Cp. Antoninus, xii. 27, ix. 34, with Gataker's notes; Plutarch *Moralia*, 39 D, with Wyttenbach's notes; Epictetus, *Diss.* II. 17, 1. The first thing a student of philosophy has to do is ἀποβαλεῖν οἷσιν. Cp. II. 11, 1, 6-8; III. 14, 8. Bonhöffer, *Epictet und die Stoa*, I. 4.

⁵ Cp. *Select Discourses*, by John Smith. Ed. Williams, Cambridge, 1869. Pp. 400, 401, "This is more or less the genius of wicked men; they will be something in themselves, they wrap up themselves in their own being, move up and down in a sphere of self-love, live a professed

in so many other things, combines the most pronounced differences in his own writings, and has given sharpest expression to the opposing extremes of Stoic philosophy. We find him, for example, expatiating on the benefits which man owes to God, and insisting that none are or can be good without God's help ; but, on the other hand, Seneca, far more than Epictetus, is wont to descant, with offensive arrogance, on the equality of the wise man to God, nay even upon his absolute superiority. The power to be good or wise God has given to all, the attainment of goodness is man's own. *Quid haberes, quod in philosophia suspiceret si beneficiaria res esset?*¹ Philo would close his ears in holy horror.

To the Stoics the human "I" which acts is also divine, but it is a real and separate and responsible being. If it is blameable for its sins, it is commendable for its virtues. What we achieve, alike in knowledge as in goodness, may be rightly regarded as our own, because it has been won by our own powers. That I am good or that I know may be due to the divine which is in me. But it is none the

Stoic independence: man the son of God, but emancipated.

less my own work, the work of the semi-divine being which is called man. If I act rationally, I *ipso facto* follow the will of God. The struggle and the triumph involved in "not my will but thine," the peace of the Everlasting Arms beneath us and around, were unknown to the Stoic, because he had an inadequate sense of the personality of God and of the frailty of man. God was too similar in kind to himself. The sense of distance in wisdom, knowledge and goodness was very insufficient. "Nearness" meant, not capacity to hearken and to save, not sympathy and care, but equality or co-essentiality of nature. Man is the son of God, but only because he is part of an omnipresent and undivided reason, which in him has been lit up with a separate consciousness. To the Jew man is not the son, but the child of God, and the metaphor depends less on the idea of kinship through participation in a common nature than on the moral relations subsisting between father and child ; on the son's conviction of the father's infinite superiority in power, wisdom and goodness, on his absolute trust and confidence in the father's loving kindness, compassion and care.

independency of God, and maintain a *meum et tuum* between God and themselves. It is the character only of a good man to be able to deny and disown himself, and to make a full surrender of himself unto God, forgetting himself and minding nothing but the will of his Creator ; triumphing in nothing more than in his own nothingness, and in the allness of the Divinity. But, indeed, this, his being nothing, is the only way to be all things ; this, his having nothing, the truest way of possessing all things." An admirer of St. Paul could say, a fine and truly Pauline passage ; an admirer of Philo could say, how noble and Philonic !

¹ Cp. Ep. XC. *init.*, LXXIII. *fin.*, LIII. *fin.* ; *De Benef.*, iv. 6 ; Zeller, iii. 1, p. 727, n. 4 ; Bonhöffer, I. 85, II. 83-86.

For the Stoics knew little (Bonhöffer says Epictetus knows nothing) of the conflict between duty and desire, between the higher and the lower self. If you know the good, you must needs desire it. Hence they felt the less need for divine aid to quicken the infirm will and help it to victory. The intense consciousness of frailty and of sin leads on to the conviction that the unassisted will is insufficient to overmaster that frailty, or overcome the power of that sin. Then with the realisation of the need of God's assistance, there comes the prayer for it, and with the prayer the assurance of response. But the Stoic can scarcely require or admit a further divine element in human goodness, over and above the fact that human reason is itself divine. Which is right, Stoic or Jew, this is not the place to discuss. But Dr. Drummond is on Philo's side. He at least holds that high spiritual experience is the direct gift of God. "Spiritual things," he says, "are spiritually discerned, and no striving of the senses and the intellect, no enforcement of duty by the determined will, can ever discover that which is revealed only in visitations of the Spirit. The filial mind, the communion with God, the sense of Divine love and peace flooding our inward being, which are the essence of Christianity, cannot be created by strenuous endeavour any more than our own volition has created our physical frame ; they must come as a birth from on high, opening our eyes to a new world of heavenly beauty, and ravishing our ears with the sound of angelic songs, and giving to the conscious soul a rapture which, at its entrance on the visible scene, it could not know."¹ This passage might have been written by Philo almost as well as by Dr. Drummond ; only Philo would have expanded the statement to include all moral and intellectual excellence. If the mind or soul (he would say) were not divine, it could not be divinely fertilized, but if it were not divinely fertilized from on high, it would not, by its own unaided power, give birth to noble issue in thought and word and deed. "It is not, I think, inaccurate to say that every addition to knowledge, whether in the individual or the community, whether scientific, ethical or theological, is due to a co-operation between the human soul which assimilates, and the Divine power which inspires."²

The Stoic does not acknowledge, because he does not feel the need of direct aid from God to man.

The religious attitude of mind could in some ways be hardly more emphatically and even devotionally expressed than by Epictetus. Resignation to the divine will is a fundamental principle of his teaching, though we who read him with a deeper sense of the separate self-consciousness of man and God, and of the dependence of the one upon the other, put an added meaning into his words. A man, he

The contrast between Epictetus and Philo.

¹ Drummond, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1894, p. 220.

² A. J. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 329.

says, must "attach himself to God." What does this mean? "Whatever God wills, he wills; what God does not will he does not will also." "What God chooses is better than what I choose." And so on. Nevertheless man is independent. You can will to be good, and good you can become. But this willing, "this use of appearances," is itself God's gift. God has entrusted you to yourself, you are your own God-given "deposit"; therefore, though you must condemn your weakness and errors and get to realise them as soon as possible, there must be no despair, no mistrust in your own capacity of achievement. For God is in you. Mistrust in yourself were mistrust of God. Epictetus combines together, as fundamental pre-requisites of philosophy, the abandonment both of conceit (*οἷσις*) and mistrust (*ἀπιστία*). With him, as with the Stoics generally, God as an active and potent force in human life and labour is mainly conceived of as immanent within the human soul. It is true that he is within because he is also without, but there is no further inter-action between the two aspects. To Philo, God is rather without than within; so far as he is within, it is of grace rather than of nature, and the coalescence of human and divine is less organic than occasional. To the Stoics, man's independence, though in the last resort a gift, is yet strongly marked. Man must recognise his own divinity, and so find his salvation and his strength. To Philo, the sense of man's dependence is never wanting. God gives to the individual as well as to the kind, and what he gives he can withhold. Man must recognise God's divinity and all which it implies; he must look above far more than he must look within. It is in the realisation of the divinity of God and not of his own that he must find his salvation and his strength.¹ This we shall see proved and exemplified by Philo's doctrine of *οἷσις*. A selection of passages will bring his conception of it more clearly before us.

"Self-conceit is an unclean thing by nature."² It supposes that mind is creative, whereas in reality "the mind is not the cause of anything, but only God, who is before the mind."³ Through the eyes the mind obtains a conception of colour, through the ears of sound, through the nostrils of smell, through the tongue of taste, and so it generates "the greatest evil of the soul, self-conceit. For it con-

**Philo's
conception of
οἷσις.**

¹ Yet Philo also teaches the Stoic doctrine that every man is not only created in the divine image, but is a "fragment" of Divinity through his mind. He is no more consistent than Seneca; but of him, as of Seneca, we may say with Bonhöffer (I., p. 85), "Wir können ihm dies nicht verübeln, da ein die Vernunft befriedigender Ausgleich zwischen göttlicher Gnade und menschlicher Freiheit auch heute noch nicht gefunden ist."

² I. 53.

³ I. 75.

ceives that all which it has seen, heard, tasted and smelt, is its own possession, and that it is the discoverer and contriver of them all."¹ "But so long as the mind thinks itself the cause of anything, it is far from yielding and confessing to God. And this very act of confession and gratitude is itself God's gift."² "To God alone it befits to say 'mine, for all things are his' (Cp. 1. Chron xxix. 14). "He who says, 'mine is my mind, mine my senses, mine their products, for thought and perception are in my own power,' is a slave to his mind and senses, bad and pitiless masters."³ As slave to the mind you are condemned to perpetual ignorance; as slave to the senses, to the domination of desire. He seems to suppose that if you think your senses are your own, you will use them lawlessly; instead of controlling them, they will control you. Mixed up with that doubtless is the further feeling that you cannot triumph over desire without the aid of God, nor can you receive this aid unless you realise its need by realising the utter dependence of every faculty, whether low or high, upon the Divine Bestower. Hence, he says that it is impossible to "master pleasure unless the soul confesses that its actions and its progress are of God, and ascribes nothing to itself."⁴

Again, he says "there are two minds: the mind of the universe, which is God, and the mind of the individual. He who flees from his own mind takes refuge in the universal mind, and he confesses that the creations of the human mind are nought, and ascribes everything to God. He who flees from God, deems him the cause of nothing and himself the cause of all. . . . Such a person is a thief, he steals the property of another (for all things are God's), and he receives a heavy wound which is hard to heal, self-conceit, akin to ignorance and boorishness."⁵

**Self-renunciation
and its
meaning.**

Here, too, the intellectual and the moral are closely mingled; self-conceit is the parent of "forgetfulness, ingratitude, and self-love," and only when you know yourself do you realise God. "For remembering your own nothingness in everything, you will remember the greatness of God in all."⁶ No religion without humility. No service of God without a sense of the nothingness of man. A vivid sense of

¹ I. 149; God is always the *cause*, the human mind is but the *instrument*.

² I. 60.

³ I. 126.

⁴ I. 83. Philo sees a danger in obtaining any excellence, whether moral or intellectual, by means of labour, lest the soul should think it has acquired such excellence by its own power, and not through God who implanted the desire for it (ὁ τὸν ἔρωτα χαρισάμενος). Labour must not produce οἷησις. I. 114.

⁵ I. 93.

⁶ I. 173, 172; cp. I. 538.

human finiteness must precede the realisation of the Divine infinitude. "When Abraham knew most, he most completely renounced himself: for he who renounces himself, understands God."¹ But this humility does not involve fear. For precisely when man has recognised his own nothingness to the full, he may take confidence to supplicate God."² "He will then abandon treacherous self-conceit (ἡ ἐπίβουλος οἷσις), and find in self-knowledge the most useful purification."³ "For the descent of the soul is its ascent by self-conceit, but its true ascent is a return from pride."⁴

Since then nothing is truly our own, not even life itself, but all good things of soul and body are gifts of God, Philo draws the important ethical consequence that we should use these gifts to good purpose. "Having the use of them, we shall take care of them as God's property, remembering that the Master, when he pleases, may recall his own. And so our grief at their removal will be much lightened. The 'many,' thinking all they possess their own, straightway at the loss of anything are plunged in grief. To realise that the world and all that it contains is the work and property of God is not only a truth, but tends powerfully to consolation."⁵ The gifts of God, he says elsewhere, must be received, not for oneself, but as loans or deposits, to be returned at their due season, and therefore treated with all care. Self-conceit makes men regard these gifts as property, and self-love following on self-conceit makes men use and misuse this supposed property for themselves instead of for society and for God. Philo notes three main deposits which God has placed in our custody,

**The ethical
effects of
humility
and of
οἷσις.**

¹ I. 629 *fin.* The play in Greek is untranslatable: ὅτε μάλιστα ἔγνω, τότε μάλιστα ἀπίγνω ἐαυτόν . . . ὁ δ' ἀπογνούς ἐαυτόν, γινώσκει τὸν ὄντα. Cp. I. 653.

² I. 477; cp. I. 151 *fin.*: "Those who come down from boasting (οἷσις) are raised up by the reasoning of virtue (ὁ ἀρετῆς λόγος) to true renown."

³ II. 252.

⁴ II. 667.

⁵ I. 160; cp. Epictetus *Encheiridion*, xi: "Never say about anything, I have lost it, but say, I have restored it. Is your child dead? It has been restored. Is your wife dead? She has been restored. Has your estate been taken from you? Has not, then, this also been restored? But he who has taken it from me is a bad man. But what is it to you, by whose hands the Giver demanded it back? So long as he may allow you, take care of it as a thing which belongs to another, as travellers do with their inn." Cp. Plutarch *Ad Apollonium Consolatio*, chap. xxviii. 116 A, with Wytenbach's notes. Euripides *Phænissæ*, 555-557 (perhaps spurious) οὔτοι τὰ χρήματ' ἴδια κέκτηνται βροτοί, τὰ τῶν θεῶν δ' ἔχοντες ἐπιμελούμεθα· ὅταν δὲ χρήζωσ', αὐτ' ἀφαιρῶνται πάλιν. Antoninus XII. 26; Seneca *Ad Marciam*, x.

soul, speech, and sense. Those who attribute these things to themselves misspend them all. Their soul is treacherous, their speech insolent, their "senses" insatiate. But those who attribute them to God, use their minds to contemplate the things of God and his goodness, their speech to honour and praise him, and their senses to understand his world. "And if any man were able with every part of him to live to God rather than to himself, by his senses investigating the visible world to discover truth, by his soul contemplating with true philosophy the world of mind, and by his speech glorifying the Creator and his works, such a one would indeed live a happy and a blessed life."¹

Philo is wont to use very violent language in these oppositions of the good and the bad. The "selfish" man has a whole catalogue of vices appended to his special fault; the man who "attributes all things to God" has all the virtues.

**Repentance and
its value.**

Yet, as I have indicated before, he does not absolutely preclude the notion of a passage from the category of evil to the category of good. And so we may notice that repentance is occasionally alluded to. "Never to sin," he acknowledges, "is the peculiar quality of God, perhaps also of a divine man; to repent is the quality of a wise man."² But, "while iniquity is swift and continuous and frequent, repentance is slow and deliberate and in the future."³ Philo will not admit the famous Rabbinic paradox that repentance is superior to perfection (τελειότης).⁴ It is the principal blessing of the second class, whereas the highest, though possibly unattainable blessing is a never-failing recollection of the best.⁵ Such a recollection, if ever present to and realised by the mind, would, I suppose, according both to Socratic and Philonic psychology, prevent the possibility of error or of sin. "Even in the souls of those who repent, the scars and impressions of their old wickedness remain."⁶ Still he calls repentance, like conscience, a "councillor who does not flatter, and is incorruptible,"⁷ and he also implies that one can never know that it is too late to mend. "God, the pitying Saviour, can easily bring back the mind from long wandering and in evil plight through pleasure and desire—hard taskmasters that

¹ I. 487, 488. Cp. Epictetus *Discourses*, I. xvi., "On Providence," ending with the noble words, "If I were a nightingale, I would do the part of a nightingale; if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise God; this is my work. I do it, nor will I desert this post so long as I am allowed to keep it; and I exhort you to join in this same song."

² I. 569; II. 405.

³ I. 569.

⁴ II. 5.

⁵ II. 405.

⁶ II. 228. The Stoics taught the same as regards the incomplete healing of the passions of the soul. Cp. Seneca *De Ira*, I. 16, quoting Zeno; *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Ed. Pearson, No. 158, p. 195, and Epictetus *Discourses*, II. 18.

⁷ I. 697.

they are—into the right way, if only it has once determined to pursue the good flight without turning round.”¹ “Repentance can soothe conscience, that stern and unbribable judge.”²

As I have been led to speak of conscience, I will here quote some passages about it and use them as a bridge by which we may pass on to consider Philo’s views as to the exact relation of the human to the divine.

The history and growth of conscience is a fascinating subject. Not without interest too is the history of the term. From Euripides onwards it begins to appear in Greek literature and

The conscience. philosophy. Euripides employs the word *σύνεσις*, which is also found in Polybius, with the full meaning of conscience. But this word did not meet with general acceptance, and was exchanged for *συνείδησις* or *τὸ συνειδός*. The former word occurs once in the Wisdom of Solomon, and several times in the Epistles of St. Paul. The Stoics elaborated the theory of conscience, and often used the word. The Latin translation, *conscientia*, is frequent in Seneca, and is already employed by Cicero. Epictetus uses (though not frequently) both *συνείδησις* and *τὸ συνειδός*, and both terms are found in Plutarch.³ Philo, with scarcely more than two exceptions, confines himself to *τὸ συνειδός*. I should imagine that there are few earlier writers who speak more fully and frequently of conscience than he.

Conscience is primarily the “convicter” (*ἐλεγχος*) and the judge seated in the soul, unabashed in threat and in reproof.⁴ Against men’s will it stings them into confession of their evil deeds.⁵ It is the “true man” dwelling in the soul, now ruler and king, now judge and umpire, now witness and accuser, convicting and restraining.⁶ Philo sometimes drops the term *τὸ συνειδός* altogether, and speaks only of *ὁ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἐλεγχος*, the convicter in the soul.⁷ It is unerring, truth-telling, incorruptible.⁸ It gives the consciousness of rectitude as well as the consciousness of sin.⁹ It is born with the birth of the soul, unsusceptible of wrong, by nature ever hating the evil and loving the good; it not only accuses and convicts, but teaches, persuades, exhorts,

¹ II. 427. But on the other hand some souls which wish to repent God does not allow to do so (I. 129 *fin.*).

² I. 634.

³ More accurately *συνείδησις* occurs once only in a doubtful fragment (XCVII.), *τὸ συνειδός* once also (*Diss.* III. 22, 94), and the phrase *συνειδέναι ἑαυτῷ* twice (III. 23, 15, and *Ench.* 34). But Philo’s conception of conscience should really be compared with the Stoic theory of the *Δαίμων*, Cp. Bonhöffer, *Epictet. und die Stoa* (1890), pp. 81-86.

⁴ I. 30.

⁵ I. 423.

⁶ I. 196 *init.*

⁷ I. 565; I. 291.

⁸ I. 236; II. 649.

⁹ I. 474.

and if its owner yields, it rejoices and is reconciled, but if he resents it wages an endless war with him, both day and night, till his miserable and accursed life is ended.¹ Hence, "the wicked man bears ruin within him, for there dwells within him a designing foe. For the conscience of the evil doer is his sufficient punishment; it makes the soul cowardly, as if it had received a blow."²

In speaking of the law of Leviticus v. 20 (E. V., vi. 1), Philo assumes that the sinner is his own accuser, being convicted by his own conscience. When he has restored the deposit and goes to the temple to seek remission, the convicting conscience is the "blameless Paraclete" or advocate, whom he takes with him. For it has saved him from incurable misfortune, the deadly disease of sin, and restored him to perfect health.³ Just as we speak of conscience as the voice of God, so Philo identifies it with the Divine Logos. In one sense it is, as it were, the cause of sin, as well as the cause of well-doing, for without its presence in the soul no erroneous action could be deserving of blame, and sin would therefore be impossible. Hence Philo can say: "As long as the Divine Logos has not entered our souls all our actions are blameless." Faults of ignorance and inexperience deserve pardon. But when the true priest, conviction (*i.e.* the Logos, or conscience) enters within us, like a purest ray of light, we see the guilt of actions done previously in ignorance.⁴ The Logos comes to us as an angel-guide, removing the stumbling-block before our feet.⁵ Conscience is the "undefiled high priest" (another synonym for the Divine Logos), for whose perpetual life within the soul we shall do well to pray.⁶ "Let us supplicate God, convicted, as we are, by the consciousness (*συνειδήσει*) of our own misdeeds, to chastise rather than let us go. For if he let us go, we shall no more be servants of a gracious Lord, but of pitiless matter (*γενέσεως τῆς ἀηλεοῦς*); but if in his goodness he chastise us gently and equitably, he will correct our faults by sending conviction, the Chastener, his own Logos, into our mind, through whom, putting it to shame and reproaching it for its offences, he will bring us healing."⁷

Conscience and the Logos.

Let us pass on now to consider more specifically in what ways, according to Philo, God may be said to be within man, both habitually in the race and more particularly in the good.

How is his presence manifested? In one sense God may be said to be within every man, because God "breathed into him from above something of his own Godhead" (*τῆς ἰδίου θεϊότητος*).⁸ By virtue of his mind, every man contains "an impression, or fragment, or ray of the divine nature."⁹ As Dr.

In what senses is God within man?

¹ II. 195.

² II. 659.

³ II. 247.

⁴ I. 292.

⁵ I. 299.

⁶ I. 563.

⁷ I. 219.

⁸ I. 208.

⁹ I. 35, 332.

Drummond says, Philo was "deeply moved by the wonderful powers of reason, which extended itself to embrace the universe, and he could explain them only on the supposition that the Creator had breathed into the soul from on high a portion of His own divinity."¹ The marvellous operations of the human mind, which flies through space and outstrips time, would be impossible if God did not "seal the invisible soul with his own impressions, that not even earth might be without an image of God."² For how could the human mind, within the narrow space of a membrane or of the heart, be able to embrace the vastness of heaven and of the universe, unless it were "an undivided fragment of that Divine and blessed soul? For nothing in the Divine is cut so as to be separated, but is only extended. Wherefore the mind, sharing the perfection in the universe, whenever it contemplates the cosmos, widens with the limits of the universe, receiving no rupture, for its power is ductile."³ This interesting passage seems to imply that Divine reason being omnipresent, it may be said that we are in God, as well as that God is in us.

"Nothing earth-born," consequently, is "more like God than man."⁴ To his earthly material there has been superadded "divine spirit."⁵

Human reason is of Divine origin.

Hence he is "mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his mind."⁶ His body is "the sacred temple of a rational soul."⁷ He is a "relative and kinsman of God because of his participation in reason."⁸ On the moral side, reason, the divine image, "made real and stamped (*οὐσιωθεῖσα καὶ τυπωθεῖσα*) by the seal of God, the impression of which is the eternal Logos," is the source of both good and evil.⁹ For "mind and reason are, as it were, the home of virtue and vice; in them they seem to dwell." Some rational beings partake only of virtue, such as the stars. (Philo shares the Aristotelian belief that the stars are rational and animated beings.) Man has a mixed nature, capable both of wisdom and folly, evil and good.¹⁰ It is noticeable that Philo does not complete the series by the hypothesis of a rational being that is wholly evil. He may be credited with the negative excellence of dispensing with a devil.

In this general sense, then, God is within every member of the human race. I said before that Philo cuts no clear division between man and man, and does not refuse to the vilest all trace of the Divine.¹¹ The grave difficulties which undoubtedly ensue on making

¹ Drummond, I. 329, 330.

² I. 208.

³ I. 508 *fin.*, 509 *init.* (Drummond, I. 329).

⁴ I. 15.

⁵ I. 32.

⁶ I. 22.

⁷ I. 33.

⁸ II. 338. ἀγχίσπορος θεοῦ καὶ ἰγγενής κατὰ τὴν πρὸς λόγον κοινωνίαν, ὃς αὐτὸν καίτοι θνητὸν ὄντα ἀπαθανατίζει.

⁹ I. 332.

¹⁰ I. 17.

¹¹ I. 265.

reason the distinctively divine element in man are wholly unobserved by him, or, if observed, neglected. If human reason is the parent of sin, the immanent divinity is the cause of evil. If it is the same reason which helps the scoundrel to the carrying out of a cunning crime, and prompts the soldier to a deed of heroism, or the philosopher to the contemplation of truth, why is not the "God within" the prerogative of the sinner as well as of the saint? For the solution of these high questions we must seek no guidance in the works of Philo. Unreconciled with the theory that every man, in virtue of his reason, bears the image of God within him, he lays down the more specialised doctrine that God "dwells" only in the souls of the good—in those who are worthy to receive so high and marvellous a guest.

How far, it may well be asked, is the doctrine purely metaphorical? From one passage at the end of the *De Sobrietate*, it might seem to be so. Philo interprets the blessing of Noah to mean that he prays that God may dwell in the house of Shem, and he then proceeds to say, "What more fitting house in all creation could be found for God

**Yet God only
dwells in the
souls of the good.**

than a completely purified soul?" "But God is said to dwell in a house, not in a local sense, for he contains all things, and is contained by none, but as showing special forethought and care for that particular spot. . . . Let everyone, then, on whom the Divine favour has showered good, pray to God that he may receive the Ruler of all as a dweller in his house, for he will raise this petty dwelling, the mind, to a great height above the earth, and fasten it to the boundaries of heaven."¹ This would seem to mean no more than that God, as it were from without, exercises a special providence towards the good. But other passages show that something more is intended. For example: "Since God thus invisibly enters the place of the soul, let us prepare it, as well as we can, to be a worthy dwelling for him. For if we do not, he will unawares remove to another house, which seems to him wrought better. For if, when we are going to receive a king, we beautify our houses, sparing no means of adornment, that his rooms may be as luxurious as possible, as befits his rank, what sort of a house should we prepare for God, the King of kings and Ruler of all, who, in his condescension and love, has deigned to visit his creatures, and comes down from the limits of heaven to the ends of earth for the benefit of our race? A house of wood or stone? The idea is impious. For not even if the whole earth were suddenly turned into gold or something more precious still, and were all used up in the construction of colonnades, and gateways, and halls, and vestibules and temples, would it become a step for his feet. A fitting soul alone is a worthy house."²

¹ I. 402.

² I. 157; cp. II. 672 (Drummond, II. 281).

Removing the metaphorical dress, Philo's meaning apparently is that there is a real Divine reaction upon those who deserve it. Such a reaction or influence is not necessarily a violation of law, and it is conditioned by the likeness, at however great an interval, of the human mind to the Divine.¹ "Do not," Philo says elsewhere, "seek for the City of God on earth, for it is not built of wood or stone, but seek it in the soul of the man who is at peace with himself, and a lover of true philosophy."² In this sense, then, of the real

A scale of Divine immanence.

Divine influence, which by the law of God's relation to his human kinsman, is granted to those who are fitted to receive it, there can be and there is, a scale of increasing Divine immanence which culminates in inspiration. The lower stages of the scale are symbolised by the advent of the Logoi, the "Divine thoughts" (or by angels, their personifications); the highest stage is reached in the advent of God himself. Hence Philo says, "In the understandings of those who are perfectly purified, the God and sovereign of the universe walks about noiselessly, alone and invisibly—for there is also an oracle delivered to the wise man, in which it is said, 'I will walk about in you, and will be your God'; but in the understandings of those that are still undergoing cleansing, and have not yet entirely washed out the life, foul and sordid with heavy bodies, angels, Divine Logoi, walk, making them bright with the cleansing materials of excellence."³

Combined or parallel with this doctrine of God's immanence, and partly, perhaps, only another form of it, there can be traced in Philo's writings the doctrine of the help rendered by God

God's help in the attainment of virtue or knowledge.

to man, both in moral effort and in the acquisition of knowledge, culminating in the knowledge of God himself. These two are not really separated in Philo's mind; both are *ἀπεραι*. The notion of an unlettered saint, as ignorant of philosophy as a babe, so true to fact and so familiar to ourselves, was an unrevealed truth for the Jewish sage of Alexandria. But just as there are degrees of God's immanence, so there are degrees of God's help. It may come through his Powers, or through the Logos, or through himself. Then, too, *pari passu* with this scale of help, goes the result of it, the degree of knowledge and of virtue attained by its means.

The doctrine of the proverb "God helps those who help themselves," on which from various reasons preachers now are wont to lay much stress, was not unknown to Philo. He too speaks of the divine help as given only to those who are fitted to receive it, and in response

¹ Cp. II. 428.

² I. 692.

³ I. 643; cp. I. 638; Drummond, II. 262.

to their own exertions. Nevertheless, not unfrequently he tends in a marked manner to depreciate the function or share of human labour and effort in the attainment of moral virtue and intellectual knowledge.¹ He inclines to do this from a twofold reason. First of all, man is made thereby more dependent upon the grace of God. "Without divine grace it is impossible to abandon things mortal, or to abide amid the incorruptible."² The more feeble and uncertain the issue of human effort, the less chance for vanity and self-conceit (*οἷσις*). Secondly, in the higher stages of the knowledge of God, Philo could hardly explain, in consistency with his own theory of the divine nature, how such deeper vision could be won by mortal man, unless it were due to special inspiration, over and above the general immanence of God in all men, though doubtless based upon it and conditioned by it.

Aristotle had allotted to nature (*φύσις*), to habituation (*ἔθος*), and to teaching (*διδασχῆ*), their own proper shares in the acquisition of virtue. In Diogenes Laertius's chapter on Aristotle *ἄσκησις* is substituted for *ἔθος*. The division in this form is adopted by Philo, but is applied by him in a peculiar way and interpreted for his own ends.

**Philo's strange
use of φύσις in
this connection.**

For *φύσις* is regarded as including not only the natural endowment with which one starts at birth, but the inspiration bestowed by God. Hence the results of *φύσις* are usually higher than those of *ἄσκησις* and *διδασχῆ*. But it must be remembered that even to Philo the division between these factors in the moral and intellectual life is not a hard and fast one (II. 9). The man who starts on his race by the help of *ἄσκησις* or *διδασχῆ* can only reach the goal by the grace or inspiration of God.³

Philo's full doctrine on this point cannot be expounded here. It is well known that he has made each of the three great Patriarchs a type of the perfected result of "teaching," "training," and "nature." Abraham represents the first, Jacob the second, Isaac the third. But all three reached the goal at last, and obtained the vision of God.⁴ As a corollary to his theory he has to assume that men start with different endowments, and that these differences are predetermined by God. "There are some persons whom God, even before their

**Teaching,
training,
and nature.**

¹ At the same time he acknowledges that God has made labour the condition of every good and virtue. And a few lines further on he says: *εὐσέβεια δὲ καὶ ὁσιότης ἀγαθὰ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ θεραπείας θεοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτῶν δυνάμεθα· θεραπεία δὲ ταῖς ἐν πόνοις φιλοτιμίαις συνέζευκται.* I. 168.

² I. 379.

³ And Philo acknowledges that the end reached by all these is the same. I. 646.

⁴ I. 524, 591.

birth, fashions pre-eminently, and foreordains to them a peculiar lot.”¹ From the deep problems here raised, Philo, as Dr. Drummond truly says, “glides off” in the most unsatisfactory way. The thought is dissipated and lost sight of “in a cloud of allegory.”² The ideal representative of the virtue which comes from φύσις is described as complete and perfect from the outset. He is “self taught,” but this “self taught” means taught of God. “He is not improved by investigation or effort, but from his birth he finds wisdom made ready for him ; it is rained down on him from heaven, and he drinks of it pure draughts and is ever drunk therefrom with a rational intoxication.”³ Inflated language of this kind is very frequent. The “self taught” start at the point which διδασχὴ and ἀσκησις may bring others to in the end by constant effort and laborious toil. “They have already at hand the gifts of God in all perfection : they need no improvement, having reached, through the excellence of their nature and the fair endowment of their souls, a spontaneous and effortless wisdom.”⁴ Philo, however, acknowledges that each of the three types of life is the result of all three factors working together, though each is made to represent that factor which predominates in it. “For teaching cannot be perfected without nature and practice, nor practice unless founded on nature and teaching, nor can nature reach the goal without teaching and practice.”⁵ At the same time Aaron, who gains “virtue” by labour, is less perfect than Moses, who receives it without labour from God.⁶ This gift of God may come at any moment, and be, as it were, engrafted upon the previous results of “practice” and “teaching.” But it is still spoken of as “self-taught” wisdom. “It is useful, if not for the acquisition of perfect virtue, at least with a view to civic life, to be trained in old and primeval opinions, and to pursue the ancient reports of noble deeds which historians and poets have repeated for their own age and for their successors. But when, without our foresight or expectation, a sudden light of ‘self-taught’ wisdom flashes upon us, which opening the closed eye of the soul, makes us seers instead of hearers of knowledge, putting in the understanding the swiftest of the senses, vision, instead of the slower, hearing, it is vain to exercise the ears with words.”⁷ Philo, as we shall see, is a firm believer in sudden intuition, which, from his point of view, is the same thing as sudden inspiration. It is very curious that in one and the same paragraph he speaks of God “bestowing the principles (θεωρήματα) of his own wisdom without our toil or trouble, so that suddenly we find a treasure of perfect bliss,”⁸ and then of those who

¹ I. 104.² Drummond, II. 311.³ I. 571.⁴ I. 524, cp. I. 646.⁵ II. 9.⁶ I. 114, cp. I. 617.⁷ I. 178 (Drummond, II. 8).⁸ I. 286 (Drummond, II. 310) ; cp. I. 441.

"through the excellence of their endowment (*φύσεως εὐμοιρίᾳ*) make a hundred discoveries without any investigation, by the help of happy and well directed conjectures." And he does not appear to see any difference between the one class and the other. The conjecture is a divine chance ; but on the other hand it needs the natural endowment, which is also the gift of God. The old *θεία τυχή* of Herodotus receives, as it were, a sort of philosophical justification.

Omitting inspiration in its higher aspects for the present, let us now see in what other ways Philo teaches that help is rendered to man by God or by his Logos. When the help is ascribed to the Logos, rather than to God himself, this is because our realisation of the Divine is the subjective counterpart of the objective Divine aid. And this realisation may not, and usually will not, extend further than to the Logos, if, indeed, it extends so far.¹

Philo is wont to talk of the Divine Logoi as helping man. What does he mean by this ? A sudden thought which deterred from evil or spurred to good, a noble passage in an inspired book, the stirring utterance of a great preacher—these might all be regarded as so many separate fragments of Divine reason, which are born in, or enter the soul, but in the last resort, owe their origin to God. Philo refers much to direct Divine agency, which we should only indirectly ascribe to it.² Thus he says, "God, not disdaining to come into sensible perception, sends his own Logoi to assist the lovers of virtue ; and they treat and completely heal the sicknesses of the soul, giving sacred admonitions as immovable laws, and calling to the exercise of these, and like trainers of gymnasts, implanting strength and power."³

**The help given
to man by
the divine
Logoi.**

Of the human soul, the bodily, or as it were, earthly part, is the basis, while the mind, or heavenly part, is the head. "Up and down, through the whole soul, the Logoi of God move incessantly ; when they ascend, drawing it up with them, and disjoining it from the mortal part, and showing only the vision of things which are worth seeing ; but when they descend, not casting it down (for neither God nor a divine Logos is the cause of injury), but descending with it out of humanity and compassion towards our race, for the sake of giving assistance and alliance, in order that, breathing forth what is salutary, they may revive the soul also, which is still borne along, as it were, in a river, the body."⁴ Then follow the lines quoted already, how God walks in the minds of the

¹ I. 122.

² In all this, and what follows, I have been greatly helped by Dr. Drummond's book.

³ I. 631 (Drummond, II. 257 ; cp. 120, 218, 256, 307, 308-310).

⁴ I. 642 *fin.* 643 (Drummond, II. 261).

perfectly purified, while his Logoi walk in those who are still not wholly cleansed of error or of sin. "It seems quite clear," says Dr. Drummond, "that Philo is referring in this passage to Divine thoughts that visit and purify the mind, those 'broken lights' of God, which beam softly upon us when we cannot bear the full-orbed splendour."¹ As he elsewhere says, "If even a thought (*ἔννοια*) of God enters the mind, it immediately blesses it, and heals it of all its diseases."² The Logos is said to help those

**The help given
by the
Logos.**

who are akin, or inclined to virtue, and when it calls the soul to itself, to freeze together its earthly and appetitive elements."³ "On some the sacred Logos enjoins commands like a king; others it instructs, as a teacher his pupils; others, not knowing what is the best of themselves, it helps like a counsellor, who makes wise suggestions; while to others again, like a gracious friend, it reveals persuasively many mysteries that the uninitiated may never hear."⁴ It is difficult to say how far in this and similar passages the metaphors extend. But that Philo holds that the compelling or advising or restraining thought, which springs up within, must have a corresponding *vera causa* without—a Divine without that answers to the Divine within—seems to follow from a passage in which the saving impulse or thought is distinctly stated to reach the soul "from the outside." "So long as the mind thinks it firmly understands the objects of mind, and the sense the objects of sense, the Divine Logos stands afar off. But when each confesses its weakness, such a soul the Logos comes to meet and welcomes; it has renounced itself, and awaits the Divine aid that comes to it invisibly, and from without."⁵

In virtue, as in knowledge, God meets the sincere suppliant half way.⁶ "How great is the grace of God, who anticipates our delay, and comes to meet us, to the perfect benefit of our souls!"⁷ It is God who fertilises virtue by sending down the seed from heaven.⁸ "It is God alone who can open the womb of the soul, and sow virtues in it, and make it

¹ Drummond, II. 262.

² I. 130.

³ I. 633, 121. Cp. I. 640, where we hear of a Divine Logos that wrestles with Jacob, and gives him strength, and Dr. Drummond interprets the allegory to refer to "Divine thoughts which discipline and strengthen the mind," II. 260.

⁴ I. 649.

⁵ I. 638 *fin.*

⁶ II. 407.

⁷ I. 130.

⁸ I. 103, 147; cp. Seneca, Ep. LXXIII. *ad fin.*: Nulla sine deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quæ si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria his, ex quibus orta sunt, surgunt: si malus, non aliter quam humus sterilis ac palustris necat ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus.

pregnant and bring forth the good.”¹ The same office is elsewhere assigned to the Logos. “The divine Logos flows forth like a river from wisdom as its fountain head, that it may water and fertilise the heavenly shoots and growths of the souls that love virtue.”² “The Divine command (σύνταξις, another form of the Logos) illuminates and sweetens the soul that itself can see.” [The Divine influence must meet with a properly receptive nature.] “It shines upon it with the light of truth, and it seasons with sweet persuasion those who thirst and hunger after virtue.”³ In fine: “How could the soul have perceived God if he had not breathed into and touched it so far as man’s capacity allows? The human mind would not have ventured on such a flight, to grasp the nature of God, if God had not drawn it up to himself, so far as it could be drawn, and had not moulded it according to the powers which are within man’s capacity to perceive.”⁴

Let us now note a few interesting points in Philo’s conception of the different stages in the knowledge of God, which can be fairly understood, even when taken out of their proper place in his philosophical system as a whole.

Through the sense of sight philosophy arose. The soul was entranced by the spectacle of the sun and moon and planets and stars, and from an investigation into the causes of their movements philosophy began.⁵ Some thinkers were wise enough to adopt the opinion that the heavenly bodies were not “self-impelled by irrational movements of their own, but impelled by the intelligence of God, whom it was, therefore, fitting to call Father and Creator.”⁶ Philo is of opinion that men have won a belief in God through what we now call the argument from design. The very existence of the world demands a belief in the world’s Creator, as we infer an architect from the existence of a house. “They who reason in this manner conceive God through his shadow, realising the craftsman through his work.”⁷ This is not the more excellent way, and does not lead to the most perfect apprehension of the Divine; but, as the result of the unaided effort of the human mind, Philo thinks it deserves great praise. Such philosophers have “advanced upwards from below, and climbing, as it were, the rungs of a heavenly ladder, they have reached the Creator by logical reasoning through the contemplation of his works.”⁸

The knowledge of God: its origin, approaches and limitations.

¹ I. 123 *init.* Cf. I. 158, of the Divine Powers (Drummond, II. 312). The theological, and perhaps historical importance of this and many other similar, but stronger and more *bizarre* passages, has been recently emphasised by Mr. Conybeare in the *Academy*, December 22nd, 1894.

² I. 690.

³ I. 566.

⁴ I. 51.

⁵ I. 12, 18.

⁶ II. 331.

⁷ I. 107.

⁸ II. 415.

Philo's aim is to approach as near as he can to God as he is in himself, apart from what he may be inferred to be from his works. He frequently admits that this aim cannot possibly be realised. "One must first become God—which is impossible—in order to be able to comprehend God."¹ He goes so far as to say that "it is sufficient for human reason to attain to the knowledge that there is, and exists, something as the Cause of the universe; but to pass beyond this, and inquire into essence or quality, is superlative folly."² "God is not even apprehensible by the mind, except only as to existence. Existence is what we realise of him; beyond existence, nothing."³ Dr. Drummond has shown in what ways Philo passes out of and beyond this philosophical agnosticism, and how far he is justified in doing so.

In his relation to the world, God is Ruler and Creator, and these facts or inferences stamp him straightway as all-powerful and good.

God as Ruler and as Creator.

His two main names, Lord (*κύριος*) and God, typify his ruling and his goodness. It is a law of nature that a creator should care for that which he has made.⁴ Realising God then as Ruler, we fear him; realising him as Creator, and therefore as a benefactor, we love him.⁵ But neither aspect of him is the highest to which we can attain. The ruling faculty and the creative faculty are the two great powers of the Godhead. As Ruler, God is a legislator, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong; as Creative and good, God is propitious; he has pity and compassion upon his work.⁶ To each of these powers or aspects of God as realised by man, a phase of human character belongs. Of these, more anon. There is a further and higher aspect of God, or in other words, a further and higher stage in the knowledge of him, which represents the combination of the two fundamental powers of rule and creation, authority and goodness.

The Divine Logos.

This aspect is that of the Logos, the reason of God in every phase and form of it that is discoverable or realisable by man. "By the Logos God is both ruler and good."⁷ The apprehension of the Logos is the highest stage in the knowledge of God which is obtainable by ordinary man. It practically implies and includes every aspect of him which can be won independently of absolute inspiration. Most of us have to be content with considerably less; we are able to catch a glimpse of God, now in one aspect, now in another; we rarely can realise him in that combination of many aspects, which in their rational unity and completeness

¹ II. 654 (Drummond, II. 17).

² I. 258 (Drummond, II. 18).

³ I. 282.

⁴ νόμος γὰρ φύσεως ἐπιμελείσθαι τὸ πεποιηκὸς γεγονότος. II. 415.

⁵ Cp. e.g., I. 63, 144, 342, 343, 581, 582, 645.

⁶ Cp. I. 560. Drummond. II. 83, and II. 18-20. Drummond, II. 91.

⁷ I 144.

are symbolised by the Logos.¹ It is only before the mysterious, impenetrable Being, who manifests himself in all these functions of reason, that the worshippers of the Logos fall short. But the wisdom and happiness which are bestowed by the Logos, or which, as we may say, attend its realisation, are painted by Philo in the most glowing colours, just as the Logos itself, though, or rather as, inseparable from God, possesses all nameable qualities of the Divine. Commenting on the verse in the Psalms, "The river of God is filled with water," Philo declares that "it is absurd to give this name to any earthly river." But the Psalmist clearly signifies the divine Logos, "that is full of the fountain of wisdom, and is in no part of itself bare or empty. Or rather, as some one has said, it is diffused throughout the universe, and is raised up on high, through the continuous and unbroken flow of that everlasting source. In another verse of the Psalm, it is said: 'The course of the river gladdens the city of God.' What city? For the present sacred city, in which the holy temple is, lies far from the sea and from any rivers; so that it is clear that the Psalmist wishes to suggest something different from the obvious meaning, by way of metaphor. And in truth the continuous rush of the divine Logos is borne along with eager but regular onset, and overflows and gladdens all things that are. In one sense he calls the world the city of God, for it has received the full cup of the divine draught, and has exultingly received thereby a perpetual and imperishable joy. But in another sense he gives this name to the soul of the wise, wherein God is said to walk as in a city. And who can pour out the sacred cup of true joy to the blissful soul which holds out the most sacred cup, which is its own reason, except the Logos, the cupbearer of God, the master of his feast? And the Logos is not cupbearer only, but is itself the pure draught, itself the joy and exultation, itself the pouring forth and the delight, itself the ambrosial philtre and potion of happiness and joy."²

Nevertheless God is above the Logos, and there is a possible realisation of him, which transcends all that even the Logos can suggest to us. For though God be the mind or reason of the universe, we have not, in so naming him, "discovered his essence or given an exhaustive description" of his nature. "Pure Being is a more comprehensive conception than reason, and includes other predicates. Being, for instance, is eternal and omnipotent, and may have other attributes unknown to us, none of which is necessarily involved in the rational. Reason, therefore, is a mode of the Divine essence, but not that essence itself; and as in the

**God above the
Logos.**

¹ I. 122.

² I. 691. Rightly, I think, does Professor Rendel Harris speak of this chapter from the *De Somniis* as "magnificent" (*Fragments of Philo*, 1886, p. 2).

case of all the powers, God exhausts and transcends it. He may accordingly be spoken of as the fountain from which it flows, as the Being who is before it.”¹ Even the Logos is but the shadow of God.² “God is before the Logos, and superior to every rational nature.”³ Though “when you have been brought by wisdom as far as the Divine Logos, you have found the head and consummation of your devotion, you have still not reached God in his essence, but see him afar off. Or rather you only see that God is far from all creation, and the understanding of him most widely distant from all human understanding.”⁴

Yet the inspired mind, which does not start in the quest for God from his works, can get beyond the Logos. “There is a more perfect and more

**A very chosen
few can advance
beyond the
Logos.**

purified mind, initiated in the great mysteries, which knows the Cause, not from the effects, as it would the permanent substance from a shadow, but, having looked beyond the begotten, receives a clear appearance of the unbegotten, so as to apprehend from himself him and his shadow, the latter meaning the Logos and this Cosmos.”⁵ “Such a mind was Moses, who said, ‘Show me thyself, that I may see thee with knowledge ; do not reveal thyself to me through heaven, or earth, or water, or air, or anything in creation ; and let me not see thy essence reflected in any other thing, as in a looking-glass, but only in thee, who art God.’”⁶ But such highest knowledge of God can only be reached by the inspiration or revelation of God himself.⁷ From the knowledge of the perceptible world man may pass to the knowledge of the invisible Logos, but the knowledge of primal Divine Being is above both, and obtained in a different way.⁸ But it is always true to say that the special revelation is only vouchsafed to those who are worthy of it in mind (which to Philo implies in character) before it comes. Only the rarest few can bear more than the sight of the Logos : it is to the “perfect” alone that “the first God” can be revealed.⁹

The upward journey of the mind to the supreme vision of God is finely depicted in the following passage :—“As is God in the universe

**The upward
journey of the
mind.**

so is the mind in man : it is unseen, but sees all things : its essence is obscure, but it comprehends the essence of everything. And by arts and sciences it cuts for itself many roads and pathways, and passes

¹ Drummond, II. 183.

² I. 106 (Drummond, II. 190-194).

³ II. 625.

⁴ I. 630 (Drummond, II. 20, 184, 195). Cp. I. 229 *fin.*, showing how God can be at one and the same time very near and very far.

⁵ I. 107 (Drummond, II. 194).

⁶ *Ibid.* cp. I. 289.

⁷ (θεοῦ) τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπαρξιν ἀναφῆναι θελήσαντος ἰκέτη . . . ἀλήθειαν δὲ μετίασιν οἱ τὸν θεὸν θεῶ φαντασιωθέντες, φωτὶ φῶς. II. 415 ; cp. II. 18.

⁸ Cp. I. 419.

⁹ I. 128 ; I. 655. 656.

through sea and land, searching out all things within both. And it soars aloft on wings, and having investigated the air and its changes, it is borne upwards towards the æther and the revolutions of the heavens. It accompanies the stars and the planets in their circling motions, following love, the guide of wisdom, and passing beyond the sensible, it yearns for the intelligible world. Perceiving there the patterns and forms of what it had seen before in the world of sense, it is seized by their exceeding beauty with a sober intoxication, and, like the celebrators of Corybantic rites, it is overcome by enthusiasm, and filled with high desire. So it is carried forward to the very summit of the intelligible world, and seems to draw near to the great king himself. Then, as it longs to behold him, the pure and unmixed rays of Divine light are poured upon it like a torrent, so that its eye is dazzled by the brilliancy.”¹

Inspiration, if given by God, must be prepared for by man. It needs the complete abandonment of bodily desires, the absolute consecration of mind and soul to God. Without a wish or a thought that is not concentrated on truth and **Inspiration.** virtue and God, a man must “pour forth his soul’s blood as a libation, and sacrifice his whole mind to God the Saviour.”² He must break the bonds which the cares of mortal life entwine around him, and, with the utmost strain of his soul, press forward to the glorious visions of the uncreated.³

Referring to Genesis xii. 1 (“The Lord said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred and from thy father’s house”), Philo exclaims: “If any desire come over thee, O soul, to inherit Divine bliss, then abandon not only thy ‘land,’ the body, and thy ‘kinsmen,’ the senses, and thy ‘father’s house,’ the understanding (τὸν λόγον), but flee from thyself, and depart out of thyself, like men possessed in a rapt frenzy of prophetic inspiration. For when the mind is in a state of ecstasy, and no longer under its own control, but maddened and agitated by heavenly love, it is drawn up towards God, and truth is its leader and clears a path before its feet, so that it may go forth upon the highway to become the heir of things Divine.”⁴ Philo even maintains that this ecstatic condition of the mind affects the condition of the body. “When men are inspired, not only does their soul become excited and raving, but their body too becomes ruddy and fiery in colour, the inward heat of joy showing itself even externally, so that many foolish persons are deceived thereby, and confound enthusiasm with intoxication.”⁵

¹ I. 16. The relation to the Phædrus is obvious.

² I. 76.

³ I. 380.

⁴ I. 482.

⁵ I. 380.

Philo doubtless approaches near to the theory to which mystics of all ages have inclined, that the highest condition of the mind is pure

**The highest
activity of the
mind becomes
pure passivity.**

passivity: the human is blotted out to receive the Divine. What is human is individual and mortal: even mind is often connected with sense and desire, and the separate selfhood that holds asunder from God. To become one with the Divine the self must

be merged in God, and to be merged in him, its own functions and activities must be extinguished. Thus the highest faculty of the mind topples over into an abyss on the other side: having reached the summit of activity, it is ready to become the mere passive phonograph, on which to receive the impress of the divine. Alluding to Gen. xv. 12 ("And when the sun was going down, a deep sleep fell upon Abraham"), Philo says:—"As long as our mind still shines and is active, and pours a noonday light over all our soul, we are under our own control, and are not possessed; but when the mind draws near its setting, then divine ecstasy and madness may fall upon us. For when the divine light shines, the human light sets, but when the divine sets the human light reappears. This is wont to be the case with prophets. For at the coming of the Divine Spirit our mind retires, but when the Spirit departs it comes back again. For the immortal may not dwell with the mortal."¹ In another place he goes so far as to say that "a prophet utters nothing of his own, but is a mere interpreter. It is another who suggests all his words, and while he is inspired he is unaware that his own reason has vanished and has left the citadel of his soul: the Divine Spirit having entered in, plays upon his voice as on an instrument, and sounds within him to make clearly manifest that which he prophesies."² Whether in spite of his remark that the Scriptures testify of "every good man (whom they mention) that he is a prophet," he would have ventured to apply the name to himself

**Philo's own
inspiration.**

may well be doubted. But he is not afraid to confess that he has been visited at certain high and select moments, and even unawares, by divine inspiration. He says that his soul "was often accustomed to be possessed by God and to prophesy about things which it knew not."³ He speaks of the "invisible spirit which was wont to commune with him."⁴

¹ I. 511.

² II. 343. But Réville is perhaps scarcely right in calling this the *only* passage, "où se trouve la conception matérialiste d'un homme-machine, mû par l'esprit de Dieu." *Le Logos d'après Philon d'Alexandrie*, p. 50. Cp. Drummond, I. 12, 14, and the passages there quoted.

³ I. 143 *fin.* (Drummond, I. 21).

⁴ I. 692.

And elsewhere he dwells on the manner of his inspiration in detail. "I am not ashamed to relate the way in which I am myself affected, which I know I have experienced countless times. Intending sometimes to come to my usual occupation of writing the doctrines of philosophy, and having seen exactly what I ought to compose, I have found my mind fruitless and barren, and left off without accomplishing anything, reproaching my mind with its self-conceit (*οἷσις*), and amazed at the power of Him who is, by whom it has turned out that the womb of the soul is opened and closed. But sometimes, having come empty, I suddenly became full, ideas being invisibly showered upon me and planted from above, so that by a divine possession I was filled with enthusiasm, and was absolutely ignorant of the place, of those present, of myself, of what was said, of what was written; for I had a stream of interpretation, an enjoyment of light, a most keen-sighted vision, a most distinct view of the subjects treated, such as would be given through the eyes from the clearest exhibition of an object."¹

Philo's theory that every power or faculty is due to the grace of God would probably have prevented him from becoming insufferably conceited by the consciousness of these supernatural visitations. For otherwise, in accordance with his own doctrine, the fact of inspiration must, I imagine, imply the possession of every kind of excellence. The good man is on the borders of the human and divine, connected with the former as touching his mortality, with the latter as touching his virtue. He is half man, half God.² Yet filled as his mind is with "divine love," he forgets himself and all things in his rapture towards God.³ He is of that race select, "who live not far from God, with the images of immortal beauty before their mind's eye, and guided always by heavenly love."⁴

In all the stages of development, on all the rungs of the ladder on which man mounts higher and higher towards a better or more adequate knowledge of the infinite God, there are two main attitudes of the mind with which God is regarded. These two main attitudes are those with which we are familiar to-day. They are fear and love. The passages in Philo's writings which speak of them are interesting in themselves, and still more when we silently compare them with the notions about the fear and love of God current among ourselves both in the Jewish and in the Christian world. We may begin by quoting a general statement which sums up a considerable portion of his entire doctrine. "God," he says, "demands from us nothing hard or complicated, but something very easy and simple.

**Man's attitude
towards God:
Fear and Love.**

¹ I. 441 (Drummond, I. 14).

² I. 689; cf. I. 484; II. 452.

³ I. 689.

⁴ II. 421.

It is to love him as a benefactor, or, if that be too much, at least to fear him as our Ruler and Lord.”¹ It will be remembered that Philo conceives the Deity to be called Lord (κύριος) as Ruler, and God as Creator. As a Ruler, with the power that belongs to kings of doing both good and harm, he is justly feared; as Creator he desires and wills only the good, both because the cause of creation was the Divine goodness, and also because, as we have seen, it is a “law of nature” for a maker to care for that which he has made.

Love is therefore superior to fear. “A life according to God is defined by Moses as a life that loves God.”² It will also be remembered that Philo connects the principles of Love and Fear with the two Biblical statements, “God is like man,” and “God is not like man”; for all the exhortations to observe the laws that lead to piety are based either upon the fear or the love of God. “To those who do not suppose that God possesses either part or passion of man, but honour him worthily for himself alone, love is most appropriate, while to all others fear.”³

Fear and love correspond to the Deity’s two fundamental powers. The many aspects of God are of great value from a human and a religious point of view. Not all of us can realise him in the same way, so that his manifold nature, or rather the manifold forms of its manifestation, give something for each of us to lay hold of and appreciate; for, as Philo observes, with a rare access of gentleness and sympathy, “we have neither the same weakness nor the same strength.” He identifies the six main “powers” of God (of which the Logos is the first) with the six cities of refuge. “Very beautiful and well-fenced cities they are,” he says, “most admirable refuges for souls that are worthy to be saved for evermore. Good and gracious is the ordering of them to prepare and strengthen men for good hope.” Now, of the five powers that succeed to the Logos, two are primary and three are secondary. The two primary are our old friends the Creative and the Regal or Ruling Power, and these are combined into a harmonious unity in the Logos. The creative power is elsewhere called Goodness, the regal power, Authority. “By goodness God created the universe, by authority he rules it, and the Logos unites the two, for by Reason (or thought) God is both ruler and good.”⁴ Of the three secondary powers, one is a

¹ II. 257. It is strange that Philo does not quote Micah vi. 8. He very rarely indeed quotes the Prophets, preferring the most strained and ludicrous interpretation of a Pentateuchal passage to the most superb and direct passage elsewhere.

² τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ θεὸν ζῆν ἐν τῷ ἀγαπᾶν αὐτὸν ὀρίζεται Μωυσῆς. I. 238. Cp. I. 228.

³ I. 283.

⁴ I. 144.

subdivision of the Creative, namely, the Propitious, through which "the Artificer pities and compassionates his own work," while the other two are subdivisions of the Regal, in its more restricted aspect as the Legislative Power. They are the Preceptive and the Prohibitive Powers, obviously corresponding to and suggested by the positive and negative commands of the Pentateuchal law. Omitting the Logos, Philo conceives that the five powers represent five aspects in which men think of God. The first aspect is the Creative, "for he who realises that everything has been created has already acquired a great good, namely, the knowledge of the Creator, which immediately persuades the creature to love his Maker." The second aspect follows the Regal power: "By the control of necessity the subject is admonished through *fear* of the Ruler, when he does not, like a child, obey his father through love." The third aspect rather erratically takes us back to the first power. It is the aspect which appeals to the sinner: "For he who is convinced that God is not inexorable, but is gracious through the essential kindness of his nature, repents of his sin through hope of forgiveness." It is noteworthy that the two lowest aspects of God are those which regard him as a Lawgiver. The one is the aspect realised by him who finds happiness in doing all that God has commanded; the other by him who, at all events, avoids evil by not doing what God has forbidden.¹

With the Second and Third Power Love and Fear correspond.

As the Logos is superior even to the creative power, it might be thought that there should exist a corresponding aspect superior to Love, and this is indicated by Philo himself in certain passages, where he states that to the perfect worshipper God is both Ruler and Creator in one.

The combination of Love and Fear.

Love and Fear are united together in a nameless combination which includes and transcends them. One could make an Hegelian or homiletic application of this idea, and suggest how the contraries of Fear and Love are dissolved and reconciled in a higher unity above them. "Of bad men the Deity claims to be called Ruler and Monarch; of the improving, God; of the best and most perfect, Lord and God together and at once."² "He thinks it right that the bad man should be governed as by a Master; the improving benefited as from 'God,' in order that by benefits he may reach perfection; but that the perfect should be ruled as by a Master, and benefited as by God."³ It is, therefore, necessary to attempt to realise both the "goodness" and the "authority" of God; for then we shall also learn "the union and combination of these undefiled powers, the majesty of God's rule

¹ I. 560, 561.

² I. 581.

³ I. 582; cp. I. 476. The "improving" is *ὁ προκόπτων*—a term borrowed from the philosophy of the Stoics.

appearing in the manifestations of his goodness, and his goodness appearing in the manifestations of his rule. So shall we acquire the virtues born of these conceptions, a love (*φιλοφροσύνη*) and reverence (*εὐλάβεια*) of God. Then in prosperity we shall not talk big, remembering the greatness of God's mighty rule, and in adversity we shall not despair, remembering God's gentleness" (*ἡμερότης*).¹

But Philo is not always consistent, and sometimes prefers to this combination a Love which has cast out or is independent of Fear.

Jacob's prayer, "Then shall the Lord be my God"

Love alone. (Gen. xxviii. 21), Philo interprets to mean: "May he no longer display to me the despotism of his

absolute authority, but the beneficence of his saving power, that is gracious to all; removing from the soul the fear felt towards him as to a Master, and implanting the friendship and affection that may be felt to a Benefactor."² Again, of Abraham, the lower type of character, the Deity is called God and Lord; of Isaac, the highest type, he is only God. "For the one disposition needs the care of two powers, rule and beneficence, that through the might of the Ruler it may obey his orders, and through his goodness be greatly aided. The other disposition needs beneficence only. It cannot be bettered by the Power of admonishing Rule (for it possesses the good by nature), but through the gifts showered from above, it is good and perfect at the start. . . . What can be a greater good than to obtain pure and unmixed beneficence? And what can be more wonderful than the mixture of gift and rule? Perceiving which, Jacob prayed that 'the Lord might become his God,' for he desired no longer to fear (*εὐλαβεῖσθαι*) him as a ruler, but to honour him lovingly as a benefactor" (*ὡς εὐεργέτην ἀγαπητικῶς τιμᾶν*).³

Thus Philo can be quoted in support of either view: for fear and love combined, or for that perfect love which knows honour, but is ignorant of fear.⁴

¹ I. 144. With Philo's idea that the most perfect attitude of man towards God is a combination of Love and Fear, may be compared a striking sermon of the late Dr. P. F. Frankl on the same subject. Frankl contends that it is Judaism alone which maintains this harmonious combination as contrasted with the one-sided emphasis on Love and on Fear in Christianity and in Mohammedanism respectively. (*Fest und Gelegenheits-Predigten*. Berlin, 1888, pp. 191-199.)

² I. 342 *fin.*, 343 *init.*

³ I. 645.

⁴ Seneca says (*De Benef.* IV. 9): "Deos nemo sanus timet. Furor est enim metueri salutaria nec quisquam amat quos timet." I doubt whether the second half of this sentence is true. It should, perhaps, be remembered that, in the passage quoted above, Philo speaks of the reverence (*εὐλάβεια*), not of the fear (*φόβος*) of God. Now *εὐλάβεια* in Stoic terminology is the opposite of *φόβος*, as *χαρὰ* is the opposite of *ἡδονή*. Diog. L. VII. 116.

It will be noted that Philo associates the love of God with the conception of him as a Creator. But, as we know, such a conception is not the highest. God as the Good creator is still only God as seen in his works, or as manifested by his power. The Creative is his greatest power—if we put the Logos as a combination of two powers on one side—but still a power only, not the pure Being to which the power belongs. If love belongs to the realisation of the power, what is the “principle” which belongs to the realisation, so far as the human mind can go, of the Being who includes the power and transcends it? Is there any attitude towards God which transcends love?

We can extract no distinct answer from Philo to this question. But in spite of the quotations which I have just given, I hardly think that Philo gave as deep and as unselfish a connotation to the word love as we do to-day, or as, I believe, was given to it by the mystical Jewish writers of the Middle Ages. Love, to Philo, seems tinged with a taint of selfishness. It is exclusively suggested by God in his relation to man. Because he has created us and taken care of us, because he acts beneficently, mercifully, and tenderly towards us, *therefore* we love him. Our love is dependent on what he has done for us, is doing, and will do. But higher than the knowledge (and through knowledge the adoration) of God for what he has done are the knowledge and adoration of him for what he is. “In our holiest moods, when we can detach ourselves from the plurality of what he does, and adore him simply for what he is, we contemplate him as the one reality.”¹ The philosopher seeks to know and to realise God as he is in himself, over and above and transcending all his aspects and manifestations. The mystic knowledge of him, which may indifferently be regarded as the supreme result of human thought at its highest pitch and moment of development, or as the flowing over of the Divine into the human, so that the latter, as a separate, conscious, finite mind, is temporarily suspended in its exercise and individuality—this mystic knowledge of God does not realise him as Ruler or Creator, but as Being. It looks away from his works and away from man, and seeks communion and rest in the endless and infinite depths of the Divine personality, wherein all that is separate and finite is now unified, included and summed up. The rapture or ecstasy which attends this knowledge may appear to the mystic as a phase of adoration which rises even superior to love. Its worship is, at any rate, wholly pure, for it has nothing to do with the relation of God to man.

**Is there any
attitude towards
God above
love?**

That something of this sort was in Philo's mind may be gathered

¹ Drummond, II. 93.

from the long and interesting passage in which he allegorises the story of the three divine "messengers" who appeared to Abraham before his tent : "The spoken words," he explains, "are symbols of things apprehended in intelligence alone. Whenever, then, a soul, as

The triple representation of God.

it were in midday, has been illumined on all sides by God, and, being entirely filled with intelligible light, becomes shadowless with the beams that are shed around it, it apprehends a triple representation of one subject ; of one [of the three] as actually existing, but of the other two as though they were shadows cast from this. Something of a similar kind happens, too, in the case of those who live in perceptible light ; for there often occur two shadows of bodies at rest or in motion. Let no one suppose, however, that the word shadow is used strictly in relation to God ; it is merely a misapplication of the term for the clearer exhibition of the subject we are explaining, for the reality is not so. But, as one standing nearest to the truth would say, the middle one is the Father of the universe, who in the sacred Scriptures is called by a proper name the Self-existent, and those on each side are the oldest and nearest powers of the Self-existent, of which one is called Creative and the other Regal. And the Creative is Deity (*θεός*, or God), for by this he deposited and arranged everything into a cosmos, and the Regal is Lord (*κύριος*), for it is right for that which has made to rule and hold sway over that which has been produced. The middle one, then, being attended by each of the two powers as by a body-guard, presents to the seeing intelligence a mental image or representation (*φαντασία*) now of one, and now of three ; of one, whenever the soul, being perfectly purified, and having transcended not only the multitudes of numbers, but even the duad which adjoins unity, presses on to the idea which is unmingled and uncomplicated, and in itself wanting nothing whatever in addition ; but of three, whenever, not yet initiated into the great mysteries, it still celebrates its rites in the lesser, and is unable to apprehend the Self-existent Being from itself alone without anything different [from pure being], but apprehends it through its effects as either creating or ruling. This, then, is as the proverb runs, 'a second voyage,' but none the less partakes of opinion dear to God. But the former method does not partake of, but is itself the opinion dear to God, or rather it is truth, which is older than opinion and more honourable than all opining."¹

Philo proceeds to "explain" his statement by saying : "There are three classes (*τάξεις*) of human character, to each of which one of the three conceptions of God has been assigned. The best class goes with the first, the conception of the Self-existent Being ; the next

¹ All this is the translation of Dr. Drummond, II. p. 91.

goes with the conception of him as a Benefactor, in virtue of which he is called God ; the third with the conception of him as a Ruler, in virtue of which he is called Lord. The noblest character serves Him Who Is in all the purity of his absolute Being ; it is attracted by no other thing or aspect, but is solely and intently devoted to the honour of the one and only Being ; the second is brought to the knowledge of the Father through his Beneficent power ; the third through his Regal power. What I mean is this : Among men, when they perceive that people approach them with the pretext of friendship for the hope of gain, they look askance and avoid them. They fear a feigned flattering and fawning as something hurtful and offensive. But God, who cannot be harmed, gladly welcomes all who choose to honour him, on whatever ground it be ; he thinks it right to dismiss none with contumely, but almost in plain words tells those whose souls have ears to hear : ‘My highest rewards are reserved for those who honour me for myself alone ; the next best for those who hope to receive some good, or expect to find an escape from punishment ; for even if their service is hireling or selfish, nevertheless it moves within the Divine circumference, and does not wander without. The reward reserved for those who honour me because of myself is to be my friend ; the reward for those who honour me for their own needs is less than friendship, but yet consists in not being regarded as strangers. For I receive him who for his own advantage desires to share in my beneficent Power, and him too who, to avoid chastisement, supplicates in fear my Power of Lordship and Rule. For I am well aware that such men will not only not become worse, but will actually become better ; by their continuous service they attain at last to a pure and simple piety. Even if the motives from which men perform their service differ with their characters, there is no need to find fault with them, for one end and aim is common to them all, the worship of God.”¹

**The three classes
of human char-
acter and their
attitude towards
God.**

This long quotation implies that the highest attitude towards God, which corresponds with the highest conception of him, could perhaps be more rightly called Adoration than Love. But it also shows that in the wildest onset of his allegorical fervour Philo retained a shrewd power of penetration into human motive and character. For a mystic not to reject utterly an impure worship of God, but to value it at its proper worth, and to realise its possible effects for good, indicates a worldly wisdom, in the best sense of the word, of which we might hardly have thought that Philo was capable.

At the same time, he is quite sound and prophetic on the relation

¹ II. 18-20.

of outward form to true religion. Not that he wishes to break from "forms." On the contrary. He is a strong conservative, in spite of his finding the true meaning of every ritual command in some wonderful spiritual interpretation. The grounds of his conservatism are peculiar and interesting. They are introduced

in the following way : He is enumerating the Divine blessings to Abraham, the fourth of which, he says, is good repute (τὸ μεγαλῶνυμον, Gen. xii. 2). He explains it thus : "If to be good is noble, to seem good is profitable. Truth is better than reputation, but happiness consists in their union. For there are many thousands [a true Philonic exaggeration, which he would be the first to repudiate in the next page] who are purely and unselfishly devoted to virtue, and admire its native beauty, but who, having no care for their reputation among the multitude are much attacked ; though truly good, they are thought wicked. . . . To whom, then, God has granted both to be and to seem good, he is truly happy and truly renowned (μεγαλῶνυμος). And we must have a great care for reputation, as a matter of great importance and of much value, for our social and bodily life (ὁ μετὰ σώματος βίος). And almost all can secure it, who are well content not to disturb established customs, but diligently preserve the constitution of their own country.¹ For there are some who, looking upon the written laws as symbols of intellectual things, lay great stress on these, but neglect the former. Such men I would blame for their levity (εὐχερεία). For they ought to give good heed to both—to the accurate investigation of the unseen meaning, but also to the blameless observance of the visible letter. But now as if they were living by themselves in a desert, and were souls without bodies, and knew nothing of city or village or house or intercourse with men, they despise all that seems valuable to the many, and search for bare and naked truth as it is in itself. Such people the sacred Scripture teaches to give good heed to a good reputation, and to abolish none of those customs which greater and more inspired men than we instituted in the

¹ The Conservative and the Reformer may each cite Philo to their own advantage. For the former, besides the passage in the text, we have I. 393, where it is said that Moses often calls a man young, not referring to his age, but to show his disposition, that he loves innovation (νεωτεροποιία). When the Israelites want to "innovate" (νεωτερίζειν), they are given the name of foolish and childish youth (I. 394 ; cp. 395). On the other hand, we find him saying, "God teaches those who are lovers of old and fabulous times, and who do not realise his rapid and timeless power ; he urges them to take to heart what is young and growing and flourishing, that they may not, by being nurtured on old fictions, which the ages have handed down to man's deception, hold false opinions, but that,

past. For because the seventh day teaches us symbolically concerning the power of the uncreated God, and the inactivity of the creature, we must not therefore abolish its ordinances, so as to light a fire, or till the ground, or bear a burden, or prosecute a lawsuit, or demand the restoration of a deposit, or exact the repayment of a loan, or do any other thing, which on week-days is allowed. Because the festivals are symbols of spiritual joy and of our gratitude to God, we must not therefore give up the fixed assemblies at the proper seasons of the year. Nor because circumcision symbolises the excision of all lusts and passions, and the destruction of the impious opinion, according to which the mind imagines that it is itself capable of production [our old friend, *ὁλῆσις*] must we therefore abolish the law of fleshly circumcision. We should have to neglect the service of the Temple, and a thousand other things, if we were to restrict ourselves only to the allegorical or symbolic sense. That sense resembles the soul, the other sense the body; just as we must be careful of the body, as the house of the soul, so must we give heed to the letter of the written laws. For only when these are faithfully observed will the inner meaning, of which they are the symbols, become more clearly realised, and, at the same time, the blame and accusation of the multitude will be avoided.”¹

Nevertheless, on the proper relation of ritual to religion Philo is not afraid of speaking out. “If a man practises ablutions and purifications, but defiles his mind while he cleanses his body; or if, through his wealth, he founds a temple at a large outlay and expense; or if he offers hecatombs and sacrifices oxen without number, or adorns the shrine with rich ornaments, or gives endless timber and cunningly wrought work, more precious than silver or gold—let him none the more be called religious (*εὐσεβής*). For he has wandered far from the path of religion, mistaking ritual (*θρησκεία*) for holiness (*ἁγιότης*), and attempting to bribe the In-

The relation of ritual to religion.

receiving from God, who is ever young and fresh, new and good things in all abundance, they may be taught to think nothing old that is with him and nothing wholly past, but all begotten and subsisting out of time” (I. 178). Again, he makes Lot’s wife symbolise custom (*συνήθεια*), the enemy of truth, which, when anyone attempts to lead it forward, lags behind, and looks around at its old and familiar ways, and like a lifeless pillar of stone, remains behind in their midst” (I. 382). Elsewhere he says, “They who have received their notions of God’s existence rather by habit (*ἔθει*) than reason, from those who brought them up, are pious by a kind of good guess, and their religion is mingled with fear (*δεισιδαιμονία* *τῇν εὐσιβείαν ἐγχαράξαντες*)” (II. 414).

¹ I. 450, 451; cp. Friedlander’s most able and suggestive brochure, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Christenthums* (p. 151), for the religious importance of this passage.

corruptible, and to flatter him whom none can flatter. God welcomes genuine service, and that is the service of a soul that offers the bare and simple sacrifice of truth, but from false service, the mere display of material wealth, he turns away.”¹ Elsewhere, he says, “Let those who seek to show honour and gratitude to God, cleanse themselves of sin, washing away all that defiles life in word and thought and deed. For it is folly that while a man is forbidden to enter the Temple unless he has washed and cleansed his body, he should pray and sacrifice with a soiled and sullied mind. Shall the lifeless body not touch a building of lifeless wood and stone, unless it be piously washed and purified, and will any man with impure soul, and with no intention to repent, dare to approach the most pure God?”² Philo is at the most laborious, and obviously at the most unsuccessful pains to point out that the entire sacrificial system of the Pentateuch is a very network of spiritual meanings. “The only true sacrifice is the piety of a God-loving soul.”³ “The grateful soul of the wise is the true altar of God.”⁴ “God regards as the true sacrifice, not the animal, but the mind and willingness of the worshipper.”⁵ “God takes no delight, even if hecatombs are offered to him. For though all things are his, he needs nothing. He takes delight in minds that love him, and in holy men, from whom he gladly receives barley cakes and cheapest offerings as if they were most precious, and indeed prefers them. And even if they bring nothing visible at all, yet, bringing themselves in all the fulness of perfected virtue, they offer the fairest sacrifice to God. They honour God their Saviour and Benefactor by gratitude and hymns, the latter through their vocal organs, the former (without tongue and mouth) through the bare soul going forth and pouring out its spiritual invocations that the Divine ear alone can hear.”⁶

You can only speak of the *service* of God “with a difference.” For God, unlike a human master, has no needs. To that Lord you can only

**The praise
of God.**

render the service of a mind that loves him.⁷ “It is not possible to show true gratitude to God, as ‘the many’ suppose, by means of offerings and sacrifices; for the whole world would not be a sufficient temple for his

¹ I. 195.

² I. 273 *fin.*, 274 *init.*

³ II. 151, 241, 666, 680; I. 668, 683.

⁴ II. 255.

⁵ *Ibid.* The teaching of the Hebrew prophets and of the Stoics on this subject is identical, and Philo could draw from either. *E.g.* cp. Seneca *De Benef.* I. 6; “Non est beneficium ipsum quod numeratur aut traditur. sicut ne in victimis quidem, licet opimæ sint auroque præfulgeant, deorum est honor, sed pia ac recta voluntate venerantium. Itaque boni etiam farre ac fitilla religiosi sunt, mali rursus non effugiunt impietatem, quamvis aras sanguine multo cruentaverint.”

⁶ II. 254 (αὐτοὺς φέροντες πλήρωμα καλοκάγαθίας τελειότατον). ⁷ I. 202.

honour. We must employ praises and hymns, and not even those which the created voice can chant, but those with which the invisible and most pure mind may resound in song. There is an old story, invented by the sages, and handed down by memory from age to age. . . . They say that, when God had finished the world, he asked one of the angels if aught were wanting on land or in sea, in air or in heaven. The angel answered that all was perfect and complete. One thing only he desired—speech, to praise God's works, or to recount, rather than to praise, the exceeding wonderfulness of all things made, even of the smallest and the least. For the due recital of God's works would be their most adequate praise, seeing that they needed no addition of ornament, but possessed in the sincerity of truth the most perfect laud. And the Father approved the angel's words, and not long afterwards appeared the race gifted with the muses and with song. This is the ancient story; and, in accord with it, I say that it is God's peculiar work to benefit, and the creatures' work to give him thanks. They can offer him no other return; for anything that they might desire to give him in requital for what they have received is the property, not of him who would give, but of the Creator of all. Realising, then, that we can make but one contribution to the honour of God, gratitude in thanksgiving, let us offer this always and everywhere, by speech and by writing, and let us never make an end of his praise, both in poems and in prose. So shall the Creator and his world be honoured with song and without it, and in every form of music and of speech; for God, as some one said, is the noblest of causes, the world the most perfect of all created things."¹

One more passage on this subject is, perhaps, worthy of quotation. It is a parallel to a famous saying of Kant: "Of the works of creation two things are holy—heaven, which immortal and blessed natures pervade, and the mind of man, **Heaven and Man.** which is a fragment of the Divine. . . . Not unreasonably, methinks, have both of them been called praiseworthy; for it is these two, heaven and mind, which are able to show forth (*ἐκτραγῶδειν*) praises and hymns which bless and honour the Father and Creator. Man has received this glorious distinction above all other animals to worship God, and heaven is ever making melody with the perfect harmony and music of the movements of the spheres. If the sound thereof could reach our ears, ungovernable love would overcome us, wild desires and insatiable yearnings. We should refrain from all life's necessities, and be nourished no longer as mortals by food and drink through our throats, but, like those about to become immortal, through our ears by inspired strains of perfect music."²

¹ I. 348.

² I. 625, 626 *init.*

With this high conception of God's worship, there runs in Philo's philosophy an equally high conception of faith. It has been carefully analysed by Schlatter in his long-winded book *Der Glaube im neuen Testament* (Leiden, 1885).¹ He points out well that, to Philo, faith is not the condition or beginning of virtue, but its goal. In its fulness it is one of the characteristics of the perfect man.² A believing sinner is to Philo a contradiction in terms. Secondly, faith is not opposed to knowledge: the more you know an object the more you can trust it.³ And faith involves trust. Thirdly, faith in the Creator implies, as its correlative, unfaith in the creation (*γένεσις*); faith in God implies unfaith in self, *πίστις* is the opposite of *αἴησις*, a conception to which all other things in Philo's ethical and religious philosophy seem to return. A few quotations will explain Philo's doctrine more clearly.

Faith is the queen of the virtues. It is the special quality and merit of the patriarch Abraham, and the famous verse in Genesis, "And he believed in God, and God counted it to him for righteousness," is as great a favourite with Philo as with Paul. That it was counted as righteousness is no marvel to Philo, for it is no easy thing and implies the very virtues which constitute in themselves, to our philosopher, the essence of righteousness. "The only true and firm good is faith in God. Faith is the comfort of life, the fulfilment of good hope, the dearth of evil, the fulness of good, the abandonment of misfortune, the knowledge of piety, the portion of happiness, the improvement of the soul that is stayed upon the Cause of all, who *can* do everything, but *wills* to do the best." All "external and sensible things" are slippery and untrustworthy. "It is most true to say that he who believes in them disbelieves in God, while he who disbelieves in them believes in him."⁴ Confidence and faith are closely identified. He asks, "How can anyone believe in God?" The answer is: If he learns that all other things are unstable, and that God alone is stable (*ἄτρεπτος*).⁵ Faith in God implies mistrust in the created and untrustworthy world.⁶ For the only absolutely trustworthy (*πιστός*) Being is God. Next to him would come a friend of God, like Moses, who was found faithful (*πιστός*) in all God's house.⁷ Abraham, who first abandoned a false pride (*τύφος*) in the power and validity of man's unassisted senses and mind, and "passed over" to "truth," received faith as the prize of virtue. "He who

¹ Pp. 83-105. Schlatter is, of course, anxious to prove that Philo's conception of faith is much lower than Paul's, and he falls into, at least, one serious error.

² Schlatter, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁴ II. 39.

⁵ I. 82 *fin.*

⁶ ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν πίστις, ἡ πρὸς τὸ γεννητὸν ἀπιστία. I. 609.

⁷ I. 128 *init.*

truly believes and trusts in God, mistrusts all things that are created and corruptible, beginning with those powers within which are wont to be puffed up, his reason and his sense."¹ As faith is the prize, so too, it may be, as it were, given back to God its giver, as a most fair and blameless offering.² It is expressed in gratitude, not for what is passed, but for all that lies hidden in the future. Faith is shown in trust.³ The fullest faith, the most entire confidence. *πίστις* creates *παρηγορία*.⁴ But the confidence is tempered with respect (*εὐλαβεία*).⁵ Faith brings men near to God; they cleave to him through piety and faith.⁶ Faith, then, is the "most perfect virtue." Nor was it unwisely added that Abraham's faith was reckoned to him as righteousness, for true faith is no easy thing. "It is not easy to believe in God alone without the addition of aught beside, because of our affinity to those mortal things to which we are bound fast. They persuade us to trust in money and reputation and power and friends, and in health and strength of body, and in many other things; to cleanse our minds of these; to distrust the created world, which is wholly untrustworthy; to trust in God alone, who is solely and truly to be trusted—this is the work of a great and heavenly intelligence, which is no longer ensnared and enticed by any mortal thing."⁷ But this faith, which leads men to love God and obey him and cleave to him abidingly, is not, as I said before, opposed to knowledge. On the contrary, it involves, as Schlatter points out, a distinctly intellectual element. The better you know God—and this is the object of all philosophy—the better you can believe in him. When Moses asked God to reveal to him the fulness of his nature, the granting of his request was impossible. But the request itself, so far from implying any want of faith in the asker, was prompted by a desire to establish it beyond the possibility of doubt.⁸ The difficulty which we see here was not perceived by Philo. *Because* we do not fully understand God, *therefore* we believe in him. But, according to Philo, we only so far believe in him as we understand him. That which we realise, we trust. Abraham who, first of men, possessed a stable and secure conception (*ὑπόληψις*) of God was also the first man who believed in him.⁹

If the service of God brings with it a perfect faith, it also includes a perfect freedom. The famous phrase of the great Collect, "In whose service is perfect freedom," would be spoken from the heart of Philo. And it is curious to find in him a fusion of the Stoic conception of freedom as the prerogative of the wise man with the religious idea

**The service of
God is perfect
freedom.**

¹ II. 412.

² I. 154.

³ I. 442; cp. 409.

⁴ I. 475, 339; Schlatter, p. 77.

⁵ I. 477.

⁶ I. 456.

⁷ I. 485.

⁸ I. 228.

⁹ II. 442.

of freedom as rooted in complete dependence upon God.¹ It is also interesting to see how he works in the conception with his orthodox Judaism, according to which virtue so largely consists in the fulfilment of a series of commands.

The canon is laid down quite briefly in the following question and answer : "What is the surest freedom? The service of the only and wise God."² Such a service brings with it a peculiar joy and confidence.³ "Nothing so completely liberates the mind as to become a servant and suppliant of God." "For God is at once gracious, even without supplication, to those who humble and abase themselves, and are not puffed up by pride and self-conceit (ὄησις). This is deliverance; this entire freedom of the soul."⁴ True freedom is the opposite of οὐησις, to which by a side-wind we once more return.

The perfect man needs no command from without to do the good. But as the laws of the Pentateuch are the expression of absolute wisdom, the perfect man fulfils them by the inner law of his own being. In this way the antinomy is solved. "The perfect man is impelled by himself to virtuous deeds; the man under training (ἀσκητής) is impelled to them by reason, which suggests to him what he ought to do."⁵ Alluding to the verse in Genesis, where it says that Abraham kept "God's commandments, statutes, and laws," Philo observes that he was not taught to do so by books, but moved thereto by the unwritten law of his own nature. And he ends his treatise on the life of Abraham thus : "Such was the life of the founder and captain of the nation—a life, as some will say, according to law, but, as my argument has proved, itself a law and unwritten ordinance."⁶

Again, the service of God is sought for itself, and its rewards are spiritual. It will be remembered that the reward of friendship is reserved for those who worship God for his own sake.⁷ "The good man seeks the day for the day's sake, light for light's sake, and the good for the sake of the good and for no other thing. For this is the Divine Law, to honour virtue for itself."⁸ The name of Issachar is a symbol of the reward which is given for noble deeds; but perhaps, Philo adds, "The deed itself is its own complete reward."⁹ The three

**The service of
God is its own
reward.**

¹ Seneca also says : "In regno nati sumus : deo parere libertas est." *De Vita Beata* XV. *fin.*

² I. 419.

³ I. 474.

⁴ I. 534 *fin.*

⁵ I. 115 *fin.*; cp. I. 62 : "The perfect man has no need of command, prohibition, or exhortation."

⁶ II. 40.

⁷ II. 20.

⁸ I. 120.

⁹ I. 663. Cp. Epictetus *Diss.* III. 24-51. *ἐπαθλον οὖν οὐδέν; σὺ δὲ ζητεῖς ἐπαθλον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μεῖζον τοῦ καλὰ πράττειν*; cp. Seneca, *De Benef.* iv. 12.

great spiritual "prizes" are faith, pure joy, and the vision of God.¹ In one of his essays upon the Ten Commandments he pauses at the end of his exposition of the fifth "word" to say: "The punishments which attend the transgression of the first five commandments have been clearly stated. But the rewards which attend their observance, though the law has not mentioned them in definite enactment, have been indicated metaphorically. Not to think there are 'other Gods,' not to make idols, not to swear falsely, need no external reward. The mere practice of these commands is itself a complete and most perfect guerdon. For what could delight a lover of truth more than to cleave to the one God and to be devoted to his service purely and without guile? For wisdom is the prize of wisdom, and justice and all the other virtues are their own rewards. And truth, the leader and the fairest of the virtues (*δοσιότητες*), is still more its own object and its own reward, for it gives bliss to those who have it, and to their children and descendants after them a well-being that cannot be taken away. Similarly let him who honours his parents not seek any further reward. For if he reflect he will find in the honouring the reward." But suddenly, as it were, remembering the letter of the Decalogue in this particular command, Philo makes this curious qualification to his own doctrine. "Nevertheless, since the fifth commandment is less great than the first four, for they are concerned with what is Divine, but this commandment with what is mortal," God has added to it a prize. The more glorious the subject-matter of a command, the less need for external reward.²

With two or three more characteristics of Philo's conception of the highest life, this Florilegium, already over long and I fear tediously diffuse, may be brought to a close.

It is at once Hebraic and Hellenic that the good life should be hopeful. To Philo hope is the seed of which faith is the fruit. It, therefore, occupies a lower stage. Hope is the most characteristic quality of the human soul. Man is the only creature who is *ἐνελπις*. The definition of our composite nature is a mortal and rational animal, but Moses' definition of man is "that disposition (*διάθεσις*) of a living soul which hopes in the true God. For the true birth of man was from the moment when this hope began. For he who has no hope in God, has no share in rational nature."³ "Hope has been set by nature as a doorkeeper at the gates of the queenly virtues within; no man may approach them who has not done homage to hope."⁴ In another long panegyric on hope it is called "the fountain of all lives" (*ἡ πηγὴ τῶν βίων*), the stimulus to merchant

Hope.

¹ II. 412.

² *De Parentibus Colendis*, chap. xi.

³ I. 218.

⁴ II. 3.

and sailor and statesman and athlete alike ; and, as its highest praise, it is said to induce the lovers of virtue to study philosophy, "rightly deeming that they will thereby perceive the true nature of all that is, and will accomplish whatever may tend to the consummate union of both the 'practical' and the 'contemplative' life, whereto if a man attains he is straightway blessed."¹ Holy and praiseworthy is the man of good hopes : ἄγιος δὲ καὶ ἐπαίνετος ὁ εὐέλπις.²

A second characteristic of the perfect nature on which Philo lays great and frequent stress, is typified and symbolised in Isaac. It is joy.

Laughter is the meaning of Isaac's name, and joy is his peculiar grace. Isaac represents that highest virtue, which is given by nature without a struggle, and its "prize" is joy. His name is the emblem of his mind. For "laughter" is the bodily emblem of the invisible joy of the mind. Laughter is the ideal (ἐνδιάθετος) son of God. Joy is the best and fairest of the happy states by which the soul is wholly filled with cheerfulness, and rejoices in God the Father and Creator of all.³ Joy differs *toto cælo* from pleasure.⁴ "True and genuine joy (χαρά) is only found in the virtues of the soul. The wise man rejoices only in himself, not in his environment. But what is 'in himself' are the virtues of the mind, of which it is proper to be proud ; his environment is his bodily health or his riches, to boast of which is not permissible."⁵ Joy, he elsewhere says, "has this peculiar quality. Other good things have their own activity, but joy is a good both common to others and peculiar to itself, for joy is superadded to all other good things."⁶

Philo makes a most characteristic use of a verse in Genesis where, at the promise of Isaac's birth, Abraham is said "to fall upon his face and laugh." "He fell not from God, but from himself. He stood near to the changeless God : he fell from his self-conceit."⁷ "It was indeed natural that his mind should have been swollen and raised up by such a promise. But Abraham, convicting us who are wont to boast at trifles, 'fell on his face and laughed in his soul.' His face was solemn, but he smiled in his mind, where great and unmixed joy had come to dwell. And every wise man who receives a good greater than he had anticipated

¹ II. 410.² II. 3.³ II. 413 ; I. 598, 215.

⁴ It would, perhaps, be better to translate ἡδονή by "lust." Cp. Seneca *Ep. LX. ad fin.* : Gaudium hoc (*i.e.*, of the wise man) non nascitur nisi ex virtutum conscientia. Non potest gaudere nisi fortis, nisi justus, nisi temperans.

⁵ I. 217. Cp. I. 130. A momentary slip. To boast of the virtues of one's mind is surely rank οἷσις. Philo probably followed a Stoic model too closely.

⁶ I. 104. One is reminded of Aristotle's description of pleasure as ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος.

⁷ I. 605.

will, like Abraham, fall down and laugh together. That he falls down is a proof of his humility, in that he despairs of his own mortal nothingness ; that he laughs is a confirmation of his piety, in that he regards God as the cause of every good and gracious thing. Let the creature then fall down and be sad of face in accordance with his nature ; for of himself he is unstable and insecure. But let him be raised up again by God and laugh. For God alone is his support and his joy." ¹

A third—and for us the last—characteristic of the noble life is peace. For true peace is the prerogative of God and of the worshipper of God. "No man can be at peace who does not truly serve the only Being that is wholly exempt from war and abides for ever in eternal peace." ²

Peace.

"Peace is the leader of the divine powers, so that the sight of peace and the sight of God are one and the same, for God alone is true and veritable peace, but all creation is constant war." ³ True peace is, therefore, internal, the archetype of outward peace as between State and State.⁴ No man can bestow it, for it is a divine work.⁵ Rest in God and so secure it.⁶

It is on these high generalities of the ideal life, that Philo is wont to dwell, and in these he most excels ; in ethics neither student nor preacher will gather much from his pages. Some of his few good things in this department are to be found in the *Fragments*, but the genuineness of all of them is not above suspicion.⁷ I quote two or three, on Forgiveness. "If you ask pardon for your sins, do you also forgive those who have trespassed against you. For remission is granted for remission, and reconciliation with your slave secures deliverance from the divine anger."⁸ "Pardon is wont to beget repentance."⁹ "Behave to your servants as you pray that God may behave to you. For as we hear them, so shall we be heard, and as we regard them so shall we be regarded. Let us then show pity for pity, so that we may receive back like for like."¹⁰

Forgiveness.

¹ I. 602.

² I. 368.

³ I. 692.

⁴ I. 678.

⁵ II. 129, 671. Epictetus, too, speaks of the higher peace: οὐχὶ κεκηρυσμένην ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκηρυσμένην διὰ τοῦ λόγου. *Diss.* III. 13, 12.

⁶ I. 572.

⁷ As Dr. Drummond kindly pointed out to me, the very "Johannine" fragment, II. 649 *fin.*, is doubtful, because where St. John says κόσμος, Philo says γένεσις. It runs: ἀμήχανον συνυπάρχειν τὴν πρὸς κόσμον ἀγάπην τῇ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀγάπῃ, ὡς ἀμήχανον συνυπάρχειν ἀλλήλοις φῶς καὶ σκότος. But, on the other hand, compare Rendel Harris's *Fragments*, p. 7.

⁸ II. 670.

⁹ II. 672, συγγνώμη μετάνοιαν πέφυκε γεννᾶν.

¹⁰ II. 672 *init.*

A careful and thorough student of Philo could probably put together a long list of striking sayings—happy oases in wastes of rhetoric. I will only, however, mention two or three of them in haphazard order. It would be interesting to find out how many are original.

He speaks of the mind as “the soul of the soul”; of love as “the guide of wisdom”; of folly as “an immortal evil, which is always dying, but is never dead.”¹ “Into the mouth there

Happy phrases. enter food and drink, the perishable food of a perishable body; out of it issue words, immortal laws of an immortal soul, by which rational life is guided.”² He bids us lead the mind as up a “flight of stairs” to the Cause of all,³ and reminds us “that we may be aided by a threefold light “the memory of the past, the active sense of the present, and the hope of the future.”⁴ “It is not the possessions of the wicked, but all that he lacks, which are the glory and abundance of the good.”⁵ “This is the definition of greatness, to be near to God, or near to that to which God is near.”⁶

It is not the purpose of this Florilegium to say anything of Philo from a distinctively Jewish point of view, or to quote any passages from his works dealing specifically with the Jewish religion and race. On this subject he has his views and his value; but his real importance lies elsewhere. Some noteworthy conceptions and facts may, however, be gained from him even here. For example: the notion of the Jewish race as the priesthood for humanity (II. 15, 104); the wide diffusion of their laws (II. 127, 141); the worship in the Temple and in the synagogues (II. 223, 168); the observance of the Sabbath (II. 282, 630). One of the most interesting passages is that in which he speaks of the relation of the Jews to the countries in which they dwell. It is highly coloured for the occasion, but even in Philo’s age it was probably not without many grains of truth. “One country cannot contain all the Jews because of their large number; for which reason they are spread over most parts of Asia and Europe, both on the mainland and on islands. They regard Jerusalem, in which lies the Holy Temple of the Most High God, as their mother city; but the various countries in which their fathers, grandfathers and ancestors have dwelt they regard as their fatherlands, for in them they were born and bred.”⁷

**The highest
kinship is a
common faith.**

Most suggestive and valuable of all is his treatment of proselytism. At the close of my article on the Fourth Gospel (J. Q. R., October, 1894) I quoted his fine saying on the higher kinship which transcends

¹ νοῦν, ψυχῆς τινα ψυχὴν, I. 15; ἔρωτι σοφίας ποδηγετοῦντι, I. 16; κακὸν ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν ἀφούνη, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸ τεθνάναι τελευτήν οὐχ ὑπομένουσα, τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν πάντα ἐνδεχομένη τὸν αἰῶνα, I. 225 *init.*

² I. 29, based on Plato, *Timæus*, 75 E, which Philo refers to.

³ I. 247 *init.* ⁴ II. 460. ⁵ I. 548. ⁶ I. 445 *init.* ⁷ II. 524.

the kinship of blood. No less fine is the following :—"Ἐστω γὰρ ἡμῖν μία οἰκειότης καὶ φιλίας ἐν σύμβολον, ἢ πρὸς θεὸν ἀρεσκεία καὶ τὸ πάντα λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας.¹ "Let there be one bond of affection and one password of friendship, devotion to God, making piety the motive of every word and deed."² And this : Φίλτρον γὰρ ἀνυσιμώτατον καὶ δεσμός ἀλυτός εὐνοίας ἐνωτικῆς, ἡ τοῦ ἐνὸς θεοῦ τιμή. "For the most potent love charm and the indissoluble bond of good-will that makes for unity, is the worship of the one God."³

* * * * *

There shall be no moral to wind up my Florilegium. Καί μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μαθόντες λέγειν μεμαθηκέναι καὶ ἡσυχάζειν, τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως περιποιούσης ἐκάτερον.⁴

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

¹ Cp. II. 219, 258, 259, 325, 362, 365, 392, 405, 406, 433, 438 *fin.*, 677. The treatise, *De Nobilitate*, according to Massebieau, should follow immediately on the *De Pœnitentia*. "Dans ce traité, si étonnant de la part d'un Juif, Philon s'élève (avec une énergie qui rappelle le mot de Jean Baptiste à ceux qui se glorifiaient d'avoir Abraham pour père), contre ceux de ses concitoyens qui prétendaient que la naissance des prosélytes les empêchait, quelle que fût d'ailleurs leur vertu d'avoir part aux privilèges du peuple du Dieu."—*Le Classement des Œuvres de Philon*, p. 53.

² II. 259.

³ II. 219 (reading, with Mangey, ἐνωτικῆς for MS. ἐρωτικῆς).

⁴ I. 211.

[I desire to mention my great indebtedness to my friend Mr. P. E. Matheson, Fellow of New College, Oxford, for revising the whole of this essay both in the MS. and in proof.]